

Real-Time Systems
Lecture 01: Introduction
 2013-04-16
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 Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Germany

Contents & Goals

- Last Lecture:
- /:
- **This Lecture:**
- **Educational Objectives:**
 - Be able to decide whether you want to stay with us or not. (QW: an advertisement for the lecture.)
 - Agree on formalis.
- **Content:**
 - Overview: content (and non-content) of the lecture.
 - Definition: reactive, real-time hybrid system.
 - Outlook on methodology for precise development of (provably) correct real-time systems.
 - Formalis: dates/times, exercises, exam admission.
 - Literature
 - A formal model of real-time behaviour.


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Introduction

01 – 2013-04-16 – main – 01


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Subject of the Lecture



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What is a Real-Time System?




- Classical example: **Airbag Controller**
- Requirement:** "When a crash is detected, fire the airbag."
- When firing **too early**: airbag ineffective.
 - When firing **too late**: additional threat.
- Say: 300ms (plus/minus small ϵ) after a crash is the **right™** time to fire.
 Then the **precise requirement** is
 "When a crash is detected at time t , fire the airbag at $t + 300ms \pm \epsilon$."

01 – 2013-04-16 – Saabag –

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What is a Real-Time System?



- Other example: **Gas Burner**
- Leakage is practically unavoidable:
 - for ignition, first open valve
 - then ignite the available gas
 - ignition may fail...
- Leakage is **safety critical**:
 Igniting large amounts of leaked gas may lead to a dangerous explosion.

01 – 2013-04-16 – Spaburner –

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No, Really: What is a Real-Time System?

- The examples have in common that **it matters, when in time** the output for a given input (sequence) takes place.
 - For instance,
 - "free" 300ms after "crash",
 - within any interval of at least 60s, leakage (= have the gas valve open without a flame) amounts to at most 5% of the time.
- Note: **quantitative** (here) vs. **qualitative** notions of time (untimed).
- Often: There is a physical environment, which has a notion of time, and which evolves while our controller is computing.
- (Half-) **Contrast**: vending machine for soft-drinks:
 - If the customer is really thirsty, she'll wait.
 - Neither the usage of a really fast or a really slow contemporary controller causes a violation of (timing) requirements.
- (Real) **Contrast**: transformational systems, such as computing π .



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
Other Definitions (Daugkas, 1999)

- "A **real-time system** is one that has **performance deadlines** on its computations and actions."
- Distinguish:
 - Hard deadlines**: performance requirements that **absolutely must be met** each and every event or time mark." ("late/data can be bad data.")
 - Soft deadlines**: for instance, about **average** response times." ("late data is still good.")
- Design Goal:
 - A **timely system**, i.e. one meeting its performance requirements.
- Note: **performance** can in general be any unit of quantities:
 - (discrete) number of steps or processor instructions,
 - (discrete or continuous) number of seconds,
 - etc.

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
Definitions: Reactive vs. Real-Time vs. Hybrid Systems

- Reactive Systems** interact with their environment by reacting to inputs from the environment with certain outputs.
- A **Real-Time System** is a reactive system which, for certain inputs, has to compute the corresponding outputs within given time bounds.
- A **Hybrid System** is a real-time system consisting of continuous and discrete components. The continuous components are time-dependent (!) physical variables ranging over a continuous value set.
- A system is called **Safety Critical** if and only if a malfunction can cause loss of goods, money, or even life.




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The Problem: Constructing Safety-critical RT Systems



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
The Problem: Constructing Safety-critical RT Systems



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- "In constructing a real-time system the aim is to control a physically existing environment, the **plant**, in such a way that the controlled plant satisfies all desired (timing) requirements."
- The design of **safety critical** (reactive) systems requires a high degree of precision.
- We want — at best — to be sure that a design meets its requirements.
- Real-time systems are often safety-critical.**
- The lecture presents approaches for the precise development of **real-time systems** based on formal, mathematical methods.

Constructing Safety-critical RT Systems: Examples



- When a crash is detected at time t , fire the airbag at $t + 300ms \pm \epsilon$:"
- A controller program is easy:



```

while (true) do
  poll_sensors();
  if (crash) tmr_start(300ms);
  if (tmr_elapsed()) fire := 1;
od
            
```
- And likely to be believed to be correct.


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Constructing Safety-critical RT Systems: Examples

- More complicated: **additional features**.



- More complicated: **distributed implementation**.




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Prerequisites for Precise Development of Real-Time Systems

To design a controller that (provably) meets its requirements we need


- a formal model of behaviour in (quantitative) time,
- a language to concisely, conveniently specify requirements on behaviour,
- a language to concisely, conveniently specify requirements on controllers,
- a notion of "meet" and a methodology to verify (or prove) "meeting".

Then we can devise a methodology to get from requirements to a (correct) implementation — here: following [Oideog and Dierks, 2008].



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Constructing Safety-critical RT Systems: Examples



- Leakage is **safety critical**: lighting large amounts of leaked gas may lead to a dangerous explosion.

Controller program for lighting is easy: *leaf (easy)*

```
while (!flame) do
  open_valve();
  wait();
  ignite();
end
end
```

- Is it correct? (Here: Is it avoiding dangerous explosions?)


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- a language to specify behaviour of controllers,
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
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Prerequisites for Precise Development of Real-Time Systems

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
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Sketch of the Methodology: Gas Burner Example

- **Requirements**
 - At most 5% of any at least 0.0s long interval amounts to leakage.
- **Reflective Design**
 - Time intervals with leakage last at most 1s.
 - After each leak, wait 30s before opening valve again.
- **Constructive Design**
 - PLC Automaton
 - (open valve for 0.5s; ignite; if no flame after 0.1s close valve)
- **Implementation (gasworks)**
 - IEC 61131-3 program
 - PLC ADAS



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Content Overview

- Introduction
 - First-order Logic
 - Duration Calculus (DC)
 - Semantical Correctness Proofs with DC
 - DC Decidability
 - DC Implementables
- PLC Automata
 - Timed Automata (TA), Uppaal
 - Networks of Timed Automata
 - Region/Zone-Abstraction
 - Extended Timed Automata
 - Undecidability Results

$obs : Time \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(Obs)$

$(obs_1, \tau_0), \tau_0 \xrightarrow{obs_2} (obs_2, \tau_1), \tau_0 \xrightarrow{obs_3} (obs_3, \tau_2), \dots$

• Automatic Verification...


• ...whether TA satisfies DC formula, observer-based

Recap

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Content

Tying It All Together



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Maybe-Content

Worst Case Execution Time

- Recall over-simplified airbag controller:

```
while (true) do
  poll_sensors();
  if (tmr_elapsed() && tmr_start(300ms) :
    update_actuators();
  end
```


- The execution of `poll_sensors()` and `update_actuators()` also takes time! (And we have to consider it!)
- **Maybe in lecture:** How to determine the WCET of, for instance, C code (A science of its own.)

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Non-Content

Scheduling

- Recall over-simplified airbag controller:



- **Not in lecture:** Specialised methods to determine...
 - ...whether the bus provides sufficient bandwidth.
 - ...whether the Real-Time OS controlling CPU 'Controller' schedules the airbag control code in time.
 - ...how to distribute tasks over multiple CPUs.
 - etc.
- (Also a science of its own.)

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Formalia

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Formalia: Event

- **Lecturer:** Dr. Bernd Westphal
- **Support:** Dennis Gauss
- **Homepage:**

<http://srv.infomatics.uni-freiburg.de/teaching/SS2013/rtips>

- **Questions:**
- "online":
 - (i) ask immediately or in the break
- "offline":
 - (i) try to solve yourself
 - (ii) discuss with colleagues
 - (iii) contact lecturer by mail (cf. homepage) or just drop by: Building 52, Room 00-020

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Formalia: Dates/Times Break

- **Schedule:**
 - Wednesday, week N : 10–12 lecture (exercises M' online)
 - Tuesday, week $N + 1$: 14–16 lecture
 - Wednesday, week $N + 1$: 10–12 lecture
 - Monday, week $N + 2$: 14:00 (exercises M' early turn-in)
 - Tuesday, week $N + 2$: 14–16 tutorial (exercises M' late turn-in)
 - Wednesday, week $N + 2$: 10–12 lecture (exercises $M' + 1$ online)
- With a prefix of lectures with public holidays, see homepage for details.

- **Location:**
- Tuesday, Wednesday: here
- **Break:**
- Unless a majority objects **now**, we'll have a **10 min. break** in the middle of each event from **now on**.

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Formalia: Lectures

- **Course language:** English (slides/writing, presentation, questions/discussions)
- **Presentation:** half slides/half on-screen hand writing — for reasons
- **Script/Media:** slides without annotations on homepage. **Logging** to put them there before the lecture
- slides with annotations on homepage. 2-up for printing, typically soon after the lecture
- recording on lectures portal with max. 1 week delay (link on homepage – lectures is updated first, look there!)
- **Interaction:** absence often moaned but **it takes two**, so please ask/comment immediately

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Formalia: Exercises and Tutorials

- **Schedule/Submission:**
- Recall: exercises online on Wednesday before (or soon after) lecture, regular turn in on corresponding tutorial day until **14:00 local time**
- should work in groups of **max. 3**, clearly give **names** on submission
- please submit **electronically** by Mail to me (cf. homepage), some ETEX styles on homepage, paper submissions are tolerated
- **Didactical aim:**
 - deal more extensively with notions from lecture (**easy**)
 - explore corner cases or alternatives (**medium**)
 - evaluate/appreciate approaches (**difficult**)
 - additional **difficulty**: imprecise/unclear tasks — by intention
- **True aim:** most complicated rating system ever, namely two ratings
 - Good-will ("reasonable solution with knowledge before tutorial")
 - Evil/Exam ("reasonable solution with knowledge after tutorial")
- **10% bonus** for early submission.

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Formalia: Exam

- **Exam Admission:** 50% of the maximum possible non-bonus **good-will points** in total are sufficient for admission to exam
- **Exam Form:** (oral or written) not yet decided

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Formalia: Evaluation

- Speaking of **grading and examination**...
- **Mid-term Evaluation:** We will have a **mid-term evaluation**¹, but we're **always** interested in comments/hints/proposals concerning form or content.

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¹That is, students are asked to evaluate lecture, lecturer, and tutor...

References

[Douglas, 1999] Douglas, B. P. (1999). *Doing Hard Time*. Addison-Wesley.
[Olderog and Dierks, 2008] Olderog, E.-R. and Dierks, H. (2008). *Real-Time Systems - Formal Specification and Automatic Verification*. Cambridge University Press.