

Real-Time Systems

Lecture 01: Introduction

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Contents & Goals

Last Lecture:

- ./.

This Lecture:

- **Educational Objectives:**


- Be able to decide whether you want to stay with us or not. (IOW: an advertisement for the lecture.)
- Agree on formalia.

- **Content:**

- Overview: content (and non-content) of the lecture.
- Definition reactive, real-time, hybrid system.
- Outlook on methodology for precise development of (provably) correct real-time systems.
- Formalia: dates/times, exercises, exam admission.
- Literature
- A formal model of real-time behaviour.


Introduction

Subject of the Lecture



What is a Real-Time System?

Classical example: **Airbag Controller**



Requirement: “When a crash is detected, fire the airbag.”

- When firing **too early**: airbag ineffective.
- When firing **too late**: additional threat.


Say, 300ms (plus/minus small ε) after a crash is the rightTM time to fire.

Then the **precise requirement** is

“When a crash is detected at time t , fire the airbag at $t + 300ms \pm \varepsilon$.”

What is a Real-Time System?

- Other example: **Gas Burner**



- **Leakage** is practically unavoidable:
 - for ignition, first open valve
 - then ignite the available gas
 - ignition may fail. . .
- **Leakage** is **safety critical**:
Igniting large amounts of leaked gas may lead to a dangerous explosion.

No, Really, What is a Real-Time System?

- The examples have in common that **it matters, when in time**

the output for a given input (sequence) takes place.

For instance,

- “fire” 300ms after “crash”,
- within any interval of at least 60s, leakage (= have the gas valve open without a flame) amounts to at most 5% of the time.

before
after
in between

Note: **quantitative** (here) vs. **qualitative** notions of time (untimed).

- Often: There is a physical environment, which has a notion of time, and which evolves while our controller is computing.
- (Half-) **Contrast**: vending machine for soft-drinks:
 - If the customer is really thirsty, she'll wait.
 - Neither the usage of a really fast or a really slow contemporary controller causes a violation of (timing) requirements.
- (Real) **Contrast**: transformational systems, such as computing π .




Other Definitions [Douglass, 1999]

- “A **real-time** system is one that has **performance deadlines** on its computations and actions.”
- Distinguish:
 - “**Hard** deadlines: performance requirements that **absolutely must** be met each and every event or time mark.”
“(Late/data can be bad data.)”
 - “**Soft** deadlines: for instance about **average** response times.”
“(Late data is still good.)”
- Design Goal:
A **timely system**, i.e. one meeting its performance requirements.
- Note: **performance** can in general be any unit of quantities:
 - (discrete) number of steps or processor instructions,
 - (discrete or continuous) number of seconds,
 - etc.


Definitions: Reactive vs. Real-Time vs. Hybrid Systems

- **Reactive Systems** interact with their environment by reacting to inputs from the environment with certain outputs.
- A **Real-Time System** is a **reactive system** which, for certain inputs, has to compute the corresponding outputs within given time bounds.
- A **Hybrid System** is a **real-time system** consisting of continuous and discrete components. The continuous components are time-dependent (!) physical variables ranging over a continuous value set.
- A system is called **Safety Critical** if and only if a malfunction can cause loss of goods, money, or even life.




The Problem: Constructing Safety-critical RT Systems

- **Reactive systems** can be partitioned into:




The Problem: Constructing Safety-critical RT Systems

- **Reactive systems** can be partitioned into:



- “In constructing a **real-time system** the aim is to control a physically existing environment, the **plant**, in such a way that the controlled plant satisfies all desired (timing) requirements.”
- The design of **safety critical (reactive) systems** requires a high degree of precision:
We want — at best — to be sure that a design meets its requirements.
- **Real-time systems** are often **safety-critical**.
- The lecture presents approaches for the precise development of **real-time systems** based on formal, mathematical methods.

Constructing Safety-critical RT Systems: Examples



“When a crash is detected at time t , fire the airbag at $t + 300ms \pm \epsilon$.”


- A controller program is easy:

```
while (true) do
  poll_sensors();
  if (crash) tmr.start(300ms);
  if (tmr.elapsed()) fire := 1;
  update_actuators();
od
```


- And likely to be believed to be correct.

Constructing Safety-critical RT Systems: Examples


- More complicated: **additional features**.



- More complicated: **distributed implementation**.



Constructing Safety-critical RT Systems: Examples



- Leakage is **safety critical**: Igniting large amounts of leaked gas may lead to a dangerous explosion.
- Controller program for ignition is easy:


```
if (!flame) {  
  close_valve();  
  wait(tsafe);  
}  
while (!flame) do  
  open_valve();  
  wait(t);  
  ignite();  
od
```

Handwritten annotations in orange and green:

- An orange arrow points from the handwritten `wait(tsafe);` to the `wait(t);` line in the code.
- Green arrows point from the handwritten `close_valve();` and `wait(tsafe);` to the `ignite();` line in the code.

- Is it **correct**? (Here: Is it avoiding dangerous explosions?)

Prerequisites for Precise Development of Real-Time Systems



To


design a controller that (provably) meets its requirements

we need

- a formal model of behaviour in (quantitative) time,
-
-
-

Then we can devise **a methodology** to get **from requirements** to a **(correct) implementation** — here: following [Olderog and Dierks, 2008].

Prerequisites for Precise Development of Real-Time Systems



To


design a controller that (provably) meets its requirements

we need

- a formal model of behaviour in (quantitative) time,
 - a language to concisely, conveniently specify requirements on behaviour,
 -
 -
- $\square (\overbrace{FC} \Rightarrow \overbrace{FF})$
no crash on this interval
airbag not fired
on all subintervals

Then we can devise **a methodology** to get **from requirements** to a **(correct) implementation** — here: following [Olderog and Dierks, 2008].

Prerequisites for Precise Development of Real-Time Systems



To

design a controller that (provably) meets its requirements

we need

- a formal model of behaviour in (quantitative) time,
- a language to concisely, conveniently specify requirements on behaviour,
- a language to specify behaviour of controllers,
- a notion of “meet” and a methodology to verify (or prove) “meeting”.

Then we can devise **a methodology** to get **from requirements** to a **(correct) implementation** — here: following [Olderog and Dierks, 2008].

Sketch of the Methodology: Gas Burner Example

- **Requirements**

- At most 5% of any at least 60s long interval amounts to leakage.




- **Reflective Design**

- Time intervals with leakage last at most 1s.
- After each leak, wait 30s before opening valve again.




- **Constructive Design**

- PLC Automaton
(open valve for 0.5s;
ignite;
if no flame after 0.1s close valve)



- **Implementation** *(generate)*

- IEC 61131-3 program
PLC / SPS



Content Overview

Introduction

- **First-order Logic**
- **Duration Calculus (DC)**
- Semantical Correctness Proofs with DC
- DC Decidability
- DC Implementables
- **PLC-Automata**
- **Timed Automata (TA)**, Uppaal
- Networks of Timed Automata
- Region/Zone-Abstraction
- Extended Timed Automata
- Undecidability Results


$$obs : \text{Time} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(obs)$$

$$\langle obs_0, \nu_0 \rangle, t_0 \xrightarrow{\lambda_0} \langle obs_1, \nu_1 \rangle, t_0 \xrightarrow{\lambda_1} \langle obs_1, \nu_2 \rangle, t_1$$

- **Automatic Verification...**
- ...whether TA satisfies DC formula, observer-based

Recap

Tying It All Together



Maybe-Content

- Worst Case Execution Time

- Recall over-simplified airbag controller:

```
while (true) do
  poll_sensors();
  if (crash) tmr.start(300ms);
  if (tmr.elapsed()) fire := 1;
  update_actuators();
od
```

- The execution of `poll_sensors()` and `update_actuators()` also takes time! (And we have to consider it!)


- **Maybe in lecture:**

How to determine the WCET of, for instance, C code.

(A science of its own.)

- **Scheduling**

- Recall over-simplified airbag controller:



- **Not in lecture:** Specialised methods to determine...
 - ...whether the bus provides sufficient bandwidth.
 - ...whether the Real-Time OS controlling CPU 'Controller' schedules the airbag control code in time.
 - ...how to distribute tasks over multiple CPUs.
 - etc.

(Also a science of its own.)

Formalia

Formalia: Event

- **Lecturer:** Dr. Bernd Westphal
- **Support:** Dennis Gauss
- **Homepage:**

`http://swt.informatik.uni-freiburg.de/teaching/SS2013/rtsys`

- **Questions:**
 - **“online”:**
 - (i) ask immediately or in the break
 - **“offline”:**
 - (i) try to solve yourself
 - (ii) discuss with colleagues
 - (iii) contact lecturer by mail (cf. homepage) or just drop by:
Building 52, Room 00-020

Formalia: Dates/Times, Break

- **Schedule:**

Wednesday, week N : 10–12 **lecture** (exercises M **online**)

Tuesday, week $N + 1$: 14–16 **lecture**

Wednesday, week $N + 1$: 10–12 **lecture**

Monday, week $N + 2$: 14:00 (exercises M **early turn-in**)

! Tuesday, week $N + 2$: 14–16 **tutorial** (exercises M **late turn-in**)

Wednesday, week $N + 2$: 10–12 **lecture** (exercises $M + 1$ **online**)

With a prefix of lectures, with public holidays; see homepage for details.

- **Location:**

- Tuesday, Wednesday: here

- **Break:**

- Unless a majority objects **now**, we'll have a **10 min. break** in the middle of each event from now on.

Formalia: Lectures

- **Course language: English**
(slides/writing, presentation, questions/discussions)
- **Presentation:**
half slides/half on-screen **hand-writing** — for reasons
- **Script/Media:**
 - slides without annotations on **homepage**, **trying** to put them there **before** the lecture
 - slides with annotations on **homepage**, 2-up for printing, typically soon **after** the lecture
 - recording on eLectures portal with max. 1 week delay
(link on **homepage** – eLectures is updated first, look there!)
- **Interaction:**
absence often moaned but **it takes two**,
so please ask/comment immediately

Formalia: Exercises and Tutorials

- **Schedule/Submission:**

- Recall: exercises **online** on Wednesday before (or soon after) lecture, regular **turn in** on corresponding tutorial day until **14:00 local time**
- should work in groups of **max. 3**, clearly give **names** on submission
- please submit **electronically** by Mail to **me** (cf. homepage), some \LaTeX styles on homepage; paper submissions are tolerated

- **Didactical aim:**

- deal more extensively with notions from lecture (easy)
- explore corner cases or alternatives (medium)
- evaluate/appreciate approaches (difficult)
- additional **difficulty**: imprecise/unclear tasks — by intention

- **True aim:** **most complicated** rating system **ever**, namely two ratings



- Good-will (“reasonable solution with knowledge **before** tutorial”)
- Evil/Exam (“reasonable solution with knowledge **after** tutorial”)

10% **bonus** for **early** submission.

Formalia: Exam

- **Exam Admission:**

50% of the maximum possible non-bonus **good-will points** in total are **sufficient** for admission to exam

- **Exam Form:** (oral or written) not yet decided

Formalia: Evaluation

Speaking of **grading and examination**...

- **Mid-term Evaluation:**

We will have a **mid-term evaluation**^a, but we're **always** interested in comments/hints/proposals concerning form or content.

^athat is, students are asked to evaluate lecture, lecturer, and tutor...

Formalia: Questions?

References

References

[Douglass, 1999] Douglass, B. P. (1999). *Doing Hard Time*. Addison-Wesley.

[Olderog and Dierks, 2008] Olderog, E.-R. and Dierks, H. (2008). *Real-Time Systems - Formal Specification and Automatic Verification*. Cambridge University Press.