Softwaretechnik / Software-Engineering

Lecture 16: Testing & Review

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The Verifying C Compiler

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Contents of the Block "Quality Assurance"

(iv) Runtime Verification
(v) Review
(vi) Concluding Discussion
• Dependability (iii) (Systematic) Tests (ii) Formal Verification (i) Introduction and Vocabulary • Hoare calculus
• Verifying C Compiler (VCC)
• over- / under-approximations systematic test vs. experiment
 classification of test procedures
 model-based testing
 glass-box tests: coverage measures correctness illustrated
vocabulary: fault, error, failure
three basic approaches Seggio: WFA Quality Assurance
Devized: Selevio | Invited Talks
Jochen: Uthinale Wings Up Development Process, Metrics

VCC

- The Verifying C Compiler (VCC) basically implements Hoare-style reasoning.
- {pss {ps
- {p}f {g}

Special syntax:

- #include <vcc.h>
 _(requires p) pre-condition, p is a C expression _(ensures q) — post-condition, q is a C expression

- (Izrrattant expr) looop invariant, expr is a C expression
 (assert p) intermediate invariant, pis a C expression
 (cuttes 8r) VCC considers concurrent C programs, we need to declare for each procedure which global variables it is allowed to write to (also checked by VCC)
- Special expressions:
- \thread_local(&v) no other thread writes to variable v (in pre-conditions)

- \old(v) the value of v when procedure was called (useful for post-conditions)
 \tesult return value of procedure (useful for post-conditions)

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Contents & Goals

Last Lecture:

- Completed the block "Architecture & Design"
- This Lecture:
- Educational Objectives: Capabilities for following tasks/questions.
- What can we conclude from the outcome of tools like VCC?
 What is an example for not a test, non-systematic test, systematic test?
- Given a test case and a software, is the outcome successful or unsuccesful?
- How many test cases are necessary for exhaustive testing of a given software?
- The Verifying C Compiler (VCC)
- Systematic test, test case, test suite
 Testing notions
 Coverage measures

VCC Syntax Example



VCC Web-Interface



VCC says: "verification succeeded

Interpretation of Results dome The State of the S

Recall: Three Basic Directions

We can only conclude that the tool—
under its interpretation of the Cardandard.
under its platform assumptions (32-bit), etc.
— 'thinks' that it can prove |= (p) JIV' (q). Can be due to an error in the tool!

Yet we can ask for a pinetur of the product of the product of the with other tools like interactive theorem provess.

Note: $=\{false\}\ f\ \{q\}$ always holds — so a mistake in writing down the pre-condition can provoke a false negative.

VCC says: "verification failed

One case: "timeout" etc. — completely inconclusive outcome.
 The tool does not provide counter-examples in the form of a computation path.
 It (only) gives hints on input values satisfying p and causing a violation of q.
 May be a files negative if these inputs are seturally never used.
 Make pre-condition p stronger, and try again.


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 $\mathsf{input} \to \boxed{\hspace{1cm}} \to \mathsf{output}$ Testing

Formal Verification

prove $S \models \mathscr{S}$, conclude $[S] \in [\mathscr{S}]$

VCC Architecture



ξρ > x:=x-y ξρ)

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VCC Features

For the exercises, we use VCC only for sequential, single-thread programs.

VCC checks a number of implicit assertions:
 no arithmetic overflow in expressions (according to C-standard),
 arrayout-of-bounds access,
 NULL-pointer dereference,

and many more.

VCC also supports:

concurrency: different threads may write to shared global variables; VCC can check whether
concurrent access to shared variables is proporty managed;
 data structure invariants: we may deter invariants that have to hold for, e.g., records (e.g.
the length field is always equal to the length of the string field str); those invariants may
temporarily be violated when updating the data structure.

Verification does not always succeed:
 The backend SMT-solver may not be able to discharge proof-obligations (in particular non-intear multiplication and distinct are challenging);
 In many cases, we need to provide loop invariants manually.

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Testing

Quotes On Testing

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"Software can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never to show the presence of bugs, but never to show their obsence."

E. W. Dijkstra, 1970
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     "Testing is the demonstration of a program or system with the goal to show that it does what it is supposed to do." W. Hetzel. 1984

"We have of scenaric along the standard of scenaric along the scenaric along the standard of scenaric along the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             Rule-of-thumb: (fairly systematic) tests discover half of all errors.
(Ludewig and Lichter, 2013)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            13/65
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Test Case Execution, Test Suite

Test Case Execution, Test Suite

- An execution of test case T for software S is a computation path of S
- $\pi = \left(\frac{\sigma_0^i}{\sigma_0^0} \right) \underbrace{\frac{\sigma_1^i}{\sigma_1^i} \left(\frac{\sigma_1^i}{\sigma_1^0} \right) \frac{\sigma_2^i}{\sigma_2^0}}_{\sigma_2^0} \cdots \text{ where } \sigma_0^i \xrightarrow{\alpha_1^i} \sigma_1^i \xrightarrow{\alpha_2^i} \sigma_2^i \cdots = In_i \text{ for some } i \text{ in } T.$
- The test case execution is called

- * successful (or positive) if it discovered an error, i.e. if $\pi \notin Soll_i$. (Alternative test item failed to pass test containing: "test failed".) * unsuccessful (or negative) if it did not discover an error, i.e. if $\pi \in Soll_i$. (Alternative test item passed test; obey: "test passed".)

Note: if input sequence not adhered to, or power outage, etc., it is not a test execution.

 A test suite is a set of test cases. Execution, positive, and negative are lifted canonically.

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Tests vs. Systematic Tests

Test — (one or multiple) execution(s) of a program on a computer with the goal to find errors.

(Ludewig and Lichter, 2013)

(Our) Synonyms: Experiment, 'Rumprobieren'.

- Not (even) a test (in the sense of this weak definition):
- any inspection of the program,
- demo of the program,
 analysis by software-tools, e.g. for values of metrics, investigation of the program with a debugger.
- (environment) conditions are defined or precisely documented,
- Systematic Test a test with
- results documented and assessed according to criteria that have been fixed before.
 (Ludewig and Lidter, 2013) inputs have been chosen systematically,
- In the following: experiment := test test := systematic test.

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More Formally: Test Case

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• A test case T is a set of pairs \{(In_1, Soll_1), \dots\} consisting of
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 $\, \bullet \,$ a (description of a) finite set of expected computation path $Soll_i.$ ullet a (description of a) finite input sequence In_i (pairwise different in T),

- * $T_1 = (FILLUP, C50; water_blutton_cn)$ (fill up vending machine (at any time after power on), insert C50 coin (at any time), espect water button is enabled (some time later))
- $\bullet \ T_2 = \{(\sigma_0^i \xrightarrow{\alpha_1^i} \sigma_1^i; \sigma_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_2} \sigma_1) \mid \sigma_0^i(x) = 7 \wedge \sigma_1(y) = 49\}$

(input 7, expect output 49, don't care for other variables values; shorthand notation. (7,49)) $= T_3 = \{(\sigma_0^+ \stackrel{\wedge}{\rightarrow} \sigma_1^+; \sigma_0 \stackrel{\wedge}{\rightarrow} \sigma_1)\} \ \sigma_0^+ = \sigma_0^+ = 0 | x := 7\}, \ \sigma_0 = 0, \ \sigma_1 = 0 | y := 49\}$ (each and every variable value at start and at end fixed)

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The Outcome of Systematic Tests Depends on...

- the input vector of the test case (of course), possibly with timing constraints,
 other interaction, e.g., from network,
 initial memory content,

- (environmental) conditions: any apparets which could have an effect on the outcome of the test such as a which program (version) is tested? built with which complet, index, etc.? sets that (OS, architecture, memory size, connected devices (configuration?), etc.) which other offware (in which version, configuration) is involved? who tested when?
- ... so strictly speaking all of them need to be specified within (or as an extension to) In.
- In practice, this is hardly possible but one wants to specify as much as possible in order to achieve reproducibility.

 One approach:
 have a fixed build environment, a fixed test host which does not do any other jobs, etc. 17/65

Software Examination (in Particular Testing)

- In each check, there are two paths from specification to result: the production path (using model, source code, executable, etc.), and
 the examination path (using requirements specification).
- A check can only discover errors on exactly one of the paths.
- What is not on the paths, is not checked; crucial: specification and comparison.
- Difference detected: examination result is positive.
- shows no error false negative

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--- information flow examination compare --(Ludewig and Lichter, 2013)

Specific Testing Notions Cont'd

Which property is tested?

function test — functionality as specified by the requirements documents, installation test — is it possible to install the software with the provided documentation and tools?

recommissioning test — is it possible to bring the system back to operation after operation was stopped?

availability test — does the system run for the required amount of time without issues, load and stress test — does the system behave as required under high or highest bad?

... under overhald?

... under overhald may jame objects on be handled!"— that's an experiment, not a test.
"Hoy, let's yet wo many jame objects on be handled!"— that's an experiment, not a test.
(egression test — does the new version of the software behave like the old one on inputs where no behaviour change is expected?


response time , minimal hardware (software) requirements, etc.

Which roles are involved in testing?

only the developer, or selected (potential) customers (alpha and beta test),
 acceptance test — the customer tests whether the system (or parts of it, at milestones) test whether the system is acceptable.

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Test Conduction



 Test Gear:
 test driver— A software module used to invoke a module under test and, often, provide test inputs, control and monitor execution, and report test results.
 Synonym: test harness. IEEE 610.12 (1990)

stub(1) A skeletal or special-purpose implementation of a software module, used to develop or test a module that calls or is otherwise dependent on it.
(2) A computer pospars natament substituting for the body of a software module that is or will be defined elsewhere.

hardware-in-the-loop, software-in-the-loop: the final implementation is running on (prototype) hardware, other system component are simulated by a separate computer 19/65

Specific Testing Notions

- How are the test cases chosen?
- Considering the structure of the test item (glass-box or structure test).
 Considering only the specification (black-box or function test).
- How much effort is put into testing?

execution trial — does the program run at all?

throw-away-test — invent input and judge output on-the-fly,
systematic test — comebody (not authorf) derives test cases, defines input/soil,
documents test execution.

In the long run, systematic tests are more economic.

Complexity of the test item:

unit test — a single program unit is tested (function, sub-routine, method, class, etc.) module (test — a component is tested. integration test — the interplay between components is tested. system test — tests whole system.

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The Crux of Software Testing



If the display shows x, +, and y, then after pressing $\frac{1}{x}$

the sum of x and y is displayed if x + y has at most 8 digits.

otherwise "-E-" is displayed.

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The Crux of Software Testing



If the display shows x, +, and y, then after pressing =

the sum of x and y is displayed if x + y has at most 8 digits,
otherwise "-E-" is displayed.

Testing the Pocket Calculator



ast some representatives of "equivaler $n+1$, n small, $n+1$, n small, m small (for non er $n+m$, n big, m big (for non eror), $n+m$, n big, m big, m small (for eror), $n+m$, n huge, m small (for eror),	•	• n + m	n+m	n+m	• $n + 1$,	Test som
	C	. n huge. m small	, n big, m big (for	n+m, n small, m small (for non error),	n+1, n small,	Test some representatives of "equivalence classes"

2	e.g. 999999999 + 1	e.g. $12345 + 678$	e.g. 13 + 27	e.g. 27 + 1

$\begin{array}{lll} n+1, n \text{ small.} \\ & n+1, n \text{ small.} \\ & n+m, n \text{ small.} \\ & n+m, n \text{ small.} \\ & n+m, n \text{ log, } m \text{ log (for non error).} \\ & n+m, n \text{ huge, } m \text{ small (for error).} \\ & \cdots \end{array}$ Test some representatives of "equivalence classes"

27

e.g. 27 + 1 e.g. 13 + 27 e.g. 12345 + 678 e.g. 999999999 + 1

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Testing the Pocket Calculator

Testing the Pocket Calculator



n+1, n small, small (for non error). n+m, n small, m small (for non error). n+m, n big, m big (for non error). n+m, n huge, m small (for error). n+m, n huge, m small (for error).Test some representatives of "equivalence classes"

Test some representatives of "equivalence classes": n+1, n small. n+m, n small, m small (for non error). n+m, n big, m big (for non error). n+m, n hige, m small (for error).

e.g. 27+1 e.g. 13+27 e.g. 12345+678 e.g. 99999999+1

e.g. 27 + 1 e.g. 13 + 27 e.g. 12345 + 678 e.g. 999999999 + 1

Testing the Pocket Calculator

Testing the Pocket Calculator



Test some representatives of "equivalence classes"

* n+1, n small.

* n+m, n small (for non error),

* n+m, n big, m big (for non error),

* n+m, n big, m big (for non error),

* * n+m, n bigs, m small (for error),

e.g. 27 + 1 e.g. 13 + 27 e.g. 12345 + 678 e.g. 99999999 + 1

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Testing the Pocket Calculator



• ::	• $n+m$, n huge, m small (for error),	 n+m, n big, m big (for non error), 	 n+m, n small, m small (for non error). 	\bullet $n+1$, n small,	Test some representatives of "equivalence classes":
	e.g. 99999999	e.g. 12345+	e.g. 13 +	e.g. 27	

7+1 +27 -678)+1

Testing the Pocket Calculator



Test some representatives of "equivalence classes": n+1, n small. n+m, n small, m small (for non error). n+m, n big, m big (for non error). n+m, n hige, m small (for error).

e.g. 27+1 e.g. 13+27 e.g. 12345+678 e.g. 99999999+1

Testing the Pocket Calculator

Testing the Pocket Calculator



 $\begin{array}{lll} n+1, n \text{ small.} \\ & n+1, n \text{ small.} \\ & n+m, n \text{ small.} \\ & n+m, n \text{ small.} \\ & n+m, n \text{ log, } m \text{ log (for non error).} \\ & n+m, n \text{ huge, } m \text{ small (for error).} \\ & \cdots \end{array}$ Test some representatives of "equivalence classes"

e.g. 27 + 1 e.g. 13 + 27 e.g. 12345 + 678 e.g. 99999999 + 1

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 $\begin{array}{lll} & n+1, n \text{ small,} \\ & n+m, n \text{ small, m small (for non error),} \\ & n+m, n \text{ nig, } m \text{ big, } (\text{for non error),} \\ & n+m, n \text{ big, } m \text{ big (for non error),} \\ & n+m, n \text{ bigs, } m \text{ small (for error),} \\ & \cdots \\ & \cdots \\ & \cdots \end{array}$

Test some representatives of "equivalence classes"

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e.g. 27+1 e.g. 13+27 e.g. 12345+678 e.g. 9999999+1

Behind the Scenes: Test "99999999 + 1" Failed Because...

Testing the Pocket Calculator: One More Try

Testing the Pocket Calculator: One More Try

000000000

99999999

Oops...

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Software is Not Continous



-fast-f, slow-f, neelly-slow-f correct $f(x) \neq 0$ for all x is required

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Software is Not Continous



Software is (in general) not continous...

Range error: multiple "neighbouring" inputs trigger the error.
 Point error: an isolated input value triggers the error.

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When To Stop Testing?

When To Stop Testing?

- The natural criterion "when everything has been done" does not apply for testing at least not for testing pocket calculators.
- So there need to be defined criteria to stop testing; project planning considers these criteria and experience with them.
- Possible testing is done criteria:
- all (previously) specified test cases have been executed with negative result,
 testing effort sums up to x hours (days, weeks),
 testing effort sums up to y (any other useful unit).
- n errors have been discovered,

no error has been discovered during the last z hours (days, weeks) of testing,
 the average cost per error discovery exceeds a defined threshold c,

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And Software Usually Has Many Inputs

Example: Simple Pocket Calculator.


With one million different test cases, 9,999,999,999,000,000 of the 10th possible inputs remain uncovered. 9,999,999,000,000 of the possible inputs convered. 99,9999,999% not touched. IOW: only 0.00000001% of the possible inputs convered. 99,9999,999% not touched.



And if we restart the pocket calculator for each test, we do not know anything about problems with sequences of inputs...

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When To Stop Testing?



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- The natural criterion "when everything has been done" does not apply for testing at least not for testing pocket calculators.
- So there need to be defined criteria to stop testing; project planning considers these criteria and experience with them.
- Possible testing is done criteria:
- all (previously) specified test cases have been executed with negative result,
- testing effort sums up to x hours (days, weeks), testing effort sums up to y (any other useful unit),
- n errors have been discovered,
- ullet no error has been discovered during the last z hours (days, weeks) of testing,

Values for $x,\,y,\,n,\,z,\,c$ are fixed based on experience, estimation, budget, etc.. $\,$ the average cost per error discovery exceeds a defined threshold c,

Of course: not all equally reasonable or compatible with each testing approach.

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Lion and Error Hunting

"He/she who is hunting lions, should know how a lion looks like. He/she should also know where the lion likes to stay, which traces the lion leaves behind, and which sounds the lion makes."

(Ludewig and Lichter, 2013)

Hunting errors in software is (basically) the same.

- Some traditional popular belief on software error habitat: Software errors — in contrast to lions — (seem to) enjoy
- range boundaries, e.g.
- 0, 1, 27 if software works on inputs from [0, 27].
- -1, 28 for error handling,
 -2³¹ 1, 2³¹ on 32-bit architectures,
- boundaries of arrays (first, last element),
 boundaries of loops (first, last iteration),
- special cases of the problem (empty list, use-case without actor, ...),
 special cases of the programming language semantics,
- complex implementations.

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Choosing Test Cases

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Where Do We Get The "Soll"-Values From?

- ullet In an ideal world, all test cases are pairs (m,Soll) with proper "soll"-values. As, for example, defined by the formal requirements specification.

 Advantage: we can mechanically, objectively check for positive/negative.
- In the this world,
- the formal requirements specification may only reflectively describe acceptable results without giving a procedure to compute the results.
 there may not be a formal requirements specification, e.g.

- "the game objects should be rendered properly".

 "the compiler must transiste the program correctly".

 "the notification message should appear on a proper screen position".

 "the data must be available for at least 10 days".
- The testing community prefers to call any instance which decides whether results are acceptable an oracle.

Then: need another instance to decide whether the observation is acceptable.

- I prefer not to call decisions based on formally defined test cases "oracle"...; -)

Choosing Test Cases

A test case is a good test case if discovers with high probability an unknown error. An $\underline{\mathsf{ideal}}$ test case should be

- representative, i.e. represent a whole class of inputs,
 error sensitive, i.e. has high probability to detect an error,
- of low redundancy, i.e. it does not test what other test cases also test.

 Recall point errors (pocket calculator, fast/slow f,...). The wish for representative test cases is particularly problematic:

Yet there is a large body on literature on how to construct representative test cases, assuming we know the equivalence classes.

In general, we do not know which inputs lie in an equivalence class wrt. errors.

"Acceptable" equivalence classes: Based on requirement specification, e.g.

o valid and invalid inputs (to check whether input validation works).

different classes of inputs considered in the requirements,
e.g. "buy water", "buy soft-drink", "buy tea" vs. "buy beverage".

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Glass-Box Testing: Coverage

Glass-Box Testing: Coverage

- Coverage is a property of test cases and test suite.
- \bullet Recall: An execution of test case $T=(In,S\alpha ll)$ for software S is a computation path

$$\left(egin{array}{ccc} \sigma_0^i \end{array}
ight) egin{array}{ccc} \sigma_1^i & \sigma_1^i & \sigma_2^i & \cdots & \text{where } \sigma_0^i & \stackrel{i_1}{\longrightarrow} \sigma_1^i & \stackrel{i_2}{\longrightarrow} \sigma_2^i & \cdots & = In. \end{array}$$

- Let S be a program (or model) consisting of statements S_{Sm} , conditions S_{Cnd} , and a control flow graph (V,E) (as defined by the programming language).
- * Assume that each state σ gives information on statements, conditions, and control flow graph edges which were executed right before obtaining σ : $sbn: \Sigma \to 2^{Son}, \qquad cnd: \Sigma \to 2^{Son}, \qquad edg: \Sigma \to 2^{E}$
- * T achieves p% statement coverage if and only if $p=\frac{|\bigcup_{i\in \mathbb{N}_0}stm(\sigma_i)|}{|S_{Stm}|}, |S_{Stm}|\neq 0.$
- T achieves p% branch coverage if and only if $p=\dfrac{|\bigcup_{i\in\mathbb{N}_0}edg(\sigma_i)|}{|E|}$, $|E|\neq 0$.
- ullet Statement/branch coverage canonically extends to test suite ${\cal T}.$ \bullet Define: p=100 for empty program.

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Coverage Example

Coverage Example

int f(int x, int y, int z)

int f(int x, int y, int z)

$$i: i: ix (x > 100 \land y > 10)$$

 $s: z = z * 2;$
 $s: clse z = z/2;$
 $s: z = z/2;$



 $\begin{array}{l} \text{is if } (x>100 \land y>10) \\ s_1; \quad z=z*2; \\ \text{else} \\ s_2; \quad z=z/2; \\ s_3; \quad t \in 500 \lor y>50) \\ s_3; \quad z=z*5; \\ s_4; \quad \texttt{return } z; \\ \end{array}$

• Requirement: $\{true\}\ f\ \{true\}\ (no\ abnormal\ termination)$


Requirement: {true} f {true} (no abnormal termination)

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Coverage Example





• Requirement: $\{true\}\ f\ \{true\}\ (no\ abnormal\ termination)$

501, 0, 0	501, 11, 0	x, y, z	
	V	i_1/t	
		i_1/f	
	•	81	
		82	
	V	i_2/t	
		i_2/f	
	V	c_1	
		C1 C2 83	
	V	83	
	V	84	
	75	stm	%
	50	cfg	%
	25	term	i ₂ /%

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Coverage Example





• Requirement: $\{true\}\ f\ \{true\}\ (no\ abnormal\ termination)$

0,0,0	501, 0, 0	501, 11, 0	x, y, z		
		V	i_1/t		
	V		i_1/f		
		V	s_1		
	V		82		
	V	V	i_2/t		
			i_2/f		
	~	~	C1		
			C2		
	V	V	83		
	V	V	84		
	100	75	stm	%	
	75	50	cfg	%	
	25	25	term	$i_2/\%$	

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Coverage Example





Requirement: {true} f {true} (no abnormal termination)

													0, 51, 0
75	100	100	<				<		~		~		0,0,0
25	75	100	~	<		۲		V	V		V		501,0,0
25	50	75	V	<		۲		V		V		V	501,11,0
term	cfg	stm	84	83	c_2	c_1	i_2/f	i_2/t	82	s_1	i_1/f	i_1/t	x, y, z
i2/%	%	%											

Coverage Example





* Requirement: $\{true\}\ f\ \{true\}\ (no\ abnormal\ termination)$

	0,51,0	0,0,0	501,0,0	501,11,0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 50	$x_1y_1z_2$ i_1/t i_1/f s_1 s_2 i_2/t i_2/f c_1 c_2 s_3 s_4 stm cfg	% %
ŀ	100 100	100 75	75 25	50 25	cfg term	% i2/%

Conclusions from Coverage Measures

Coverage Measures in Certification

(Seems that) DO-178B,

Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification,

- * Assume, we are testing property $\varphi=\{p\}$ f $\{q\}$ (maybe just q=true with \sharp), * assume our test suite T achieved $100\,\%$ statement f branch f term coverage.

What does this tell us about f? Or: what can we conclude from coverage measures?

100 % statement coverage:

- "there is no statement, which necessarily violates φ"
 (Still, there may be many, many computation paths which violate φ, and which just have not been touched by T, e.g. differing in variables' valuation.) "there is no unreachable statement"

Currently, the standard moves towards accepting certain verification or static analysis tools to support (or even replace?) some testing obligations.

requires certain coverage results.
(Next to development process requirements, reviews, unit testing, etc.) which deals with the safety of software used in certain airborne systems,

- 100 % branch (term) coverage:
- ullet "there is no single branch (term) which necessarily causes violations of arphi" IOW: "for each condition (term), there is one computation path satisfying φ where the condition (term) evaluates to true/false"
- "there is no unused condition (term)"

Not more (\rightarrow exercises)! That's something, but not as much as "100 %" may sound...

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Term Coverage

Consider the statement

if $(A \wedge (B \vee (C \wedge D)) \vee E)$ then

 A, \ldots, E are **minimal** boolean terms, e.g. x > 0, but not $a \lor b$.

• Branch coverage is easy: use $(A=0,\dots,E=0)$ and $(A=0,\dots,E=1).$

 $\beta(A_i) = b \text{ and } \llbracket expr \rrbracket (\beta[A_i/\operatorname{true}]) \neq \llbracket expr \rrbracket (\beta[A_i/\operatorname{false}]).$

 $\bullet \; \Xi \subseteq (\{A_1,\ldots,A_n\} o B) \; ext{achieves} \; p\% \; ext{term coverage} \; ext{if and only if}$ $p = \frac{|\{A_i^b \mid \exists \, \beta \in \Xi \bullet A_i \text{ is } b\text{-effective in } \beta\}|}{2n}$

Unreachable Code

int f(int x, int y, int z)

- Statement s_1 is never executed $(x \neq x \iff \textit{fake})$, thus 100% coverage not achievable.
- Is statement s₁ an error anyway...?
- ullet Term y/0 is never evaluated either (short-circuit evaluation)


37/65

36/65

Model-Based Testing

40/65


Model-based Testing



Does some software implement the given CFA model of the CoinValidator?

41/65

Model-based Testing




- Does some software implement the given CFA model of the CoinValidator?
 One approach: check whether each state of the model has some reachable corresponding configuration in the software.

 $\bullet \ T_1 = (C50, C50, C50; \\ \{\pi \mid \exists \ i < j < k < \ell \bullet \pi^i \sim \mathrm{idle}, \pi^j \sim \mathrm{h.c50}, \pi^k \sim \mathrm{h.c100}, \pi^\ell \sim \mathrm{h.c150} \})$ checks: can we reach 'idle,' have £50,' have £100', 'have £150'?

41/65

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
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Or: Check whether each edge of the model has corresponding behaviour in the software.

41/65

41/65


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
41/65

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 (π | 31 < √ < k < ℓ * π² ~ bils, π² ~ b.c5Q, π² ~ b.c100, π² ~ b.c150)?
 checks: can we reach 'dis', 'have_c50', 'have_c100', 'have_c150'?
 T₂ = (CSQ, CSQ, ...) checks for 'have_c1".
 To check for 'drin'-ready', more interaction is necessary.
- Advantage: input sequences can automatically be generated from the model.


Existential LSCs as Test Driver & Monitor (Lettrari and Klose, 2001)



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42/65

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42/65

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Statistical Testing

43/65

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- Adjust the TBA-construction algorithm to construct a test driver & monitor and have it (possibly with some glue logic in the middle) interact with the software (or a model of it).
- ullet Test passed (i.e., test unsuccessful) if and only if TBA state q_0 is reached.
- We may need to refine the LSC by adding an activation condition, or communication which drives the system under test into the desired start state.

42/65

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Needs stochastical assumptions on error distribution and truly random test cases. (Confidence interval may get large — reflecting the low information tests give.)

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- In particular for interactive software, the primary goal is often that the "typical user" does not experience failures. Statistical testing (in general) may also cover a lot of "untypical user behaviour"; unless user-models are used.
- Statistical testing needs a method to compute "soll"-values for the randomly chosen inputs; that is easy for "does not crash" but can be difficult in general.

†: best for pipe/filter style software, where comparing output with "soll" is trivial.
*: if test case creation is postpored too long, chances are high that there will not be any test cases at all Experience. "too long" is very short.
*: error handling is also a feature.

 (iv) if no: repair,
 (v) if yes: define the observed output as "soll",
 (vi) extend script to compare ist/soll and add to test suite. (iii) carefully examine the outputs for whether they are acceptable, (ii) create script which runs the program on these inputs, (i) make up inputs for (at least one) test case,

There is a high risk for not finding point or small-range errors which do live in their "natural habitat" as expected by testers.

Findings in the literature can at best be called inconclusive

44/65

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44/65

Discussion

One Approach: Black-Box-Testing of Filter-like Software

A low profile approach[†] when a formal (requirements) specification is not available, not even "agile-style" in form of test cases

whenever* a feature** is considered finished,

Advantages of testing (in particular over inspection):

45/65

Discussion Discussion Advantages of testing (in particular over inspection): - Testing it a "natural" checking procedure, "everybody on test". - The systematic test is reproducible and objective - The systematic test is reproducible and objective (if the start configuration is proporticity and the deserminant deterministic). - Invested offer can be reason is proporticity and the deserminant destraction between the configuration of the systematic destruction of of the s Advantages of testing (in particular over inspection): Testing is a "natural" checking procedure: "everybody can test". 46/65

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 Tests test do focus only on the code, other artefacts (documentation, etc.) are had to test. (Some say developes tend to focus (commet) on coding anyway).
 Recall: some agile methods turn this into a feature: there's only requirements, tests, and code.

46/65

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46/65

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- If we have an implementation for checking whether
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 we can just embed this implementation into the actual software, and
 thereby check satisfaction of the requirement during each run.
 → run-time verification.

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Run-Time Verification







Run-Time Verification

while (true) {
 (nf x = read number ();
 (nf y = read number ();
 (nf sum = add(x, y);
 verify_sum(x, y, sum);
} display(sum);

fprintf(stderr.
 "verify_sum :_error\n");
abort();

coid verify-sum(int x. int y. int sum) if (sum != (x+y) || (x + y > 99999999 && !(sum < 0)))

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(fprintf(stderr, "verify-sum:.error\n"); abort();







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Maybe the simplest instance of runtime verification: Assertions.
 Available in standard libraries of many programming languages, e.g. C:

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```
DESCRIPTION

[2] the macro assert() prints an error message to stan dard error and terminates the program by calling abort(s) if expression is false (i.e., companies equal to zero).
The purpose of this macro is to help the programmer find bags in his program. The message "assertion failed in file foo.c., function douber(), the 1297" is of no help at all to a user.
```

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
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
Assertions at work





More Complex Case: LSC Observer

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Run-Time Verification: Discussion

- During development, assertions for pre/post conditions and intermediate invariants are an extremely powerful tool with very good gain/effort ratio (low effort, high gain).

- Effectively work as safe-guard against unexpected use of functions and regression, e.g. during later maintenance or efficiency improvement.
 Can serve as formal guapport of documentation:
 Dear reader, at this point in the program, I expect this condition to hold, because...".

51/65

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
- Development version with (cf. assert(3)) / release version without run-time verification. If run-time verification enabled in release version,
 s software should terminate as greatfully as possible (e.g. try to save data),
 save information from assertion failure if possible.

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Recall: Three Basic Directions

Run-Time Verification: Discussion

During development, assertions for pre/post conditions and intermediate invariants are an extremely powerful tool with very good gain/effort ratio (low effort, high gain).



 Drawback: development and release software have different computation paths — with bad luck, the software only behaves well because of the run-time verification code... Run-time verification can be arbitrarily complicated and complex, e.g., construction of observers for LSCs or temporal logic, e.g., expensive checking of data, etc.

51/65

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the review item, and reference documents which enable an assessment (requirements specification, guidelines (e.g. coding conventions), catalogue of questions ("all variables initialised?"), etc.)

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Roles:

Reviewer(s): person who is able to judge the artefact under review; maybe different reviewers for different aspects (programming, tool usage, etc.), at best experienced in detecting inconsistencies or incompleteness. Author: (representative of the) creator(s) of the artefact under review, is present to listen to the discussions, can answer questions; does not speak up if not asked. Moderator: leads session, responsible for properly conducted procedure.

The review team consists of everybody but the author(s). Transcript Writer: keeps minutes of review session, can be assumed by author.

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
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Review Procedure

Review Procedure

Planning

review organisation under guidance of moderator Approval of review item



review triggered, e.g., by submission to revision control system: moderator invites (include review item in invitation), state review missions,

preparation: reviewers investigate review item,
 review session: reviewers report, evaluate and document issues; solve open questions,
 "3rd hour": time for informal chair, reviewers may state proposals for solutions or improve

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postparation, rework: responsibility of author(s).
 reviewers re-assess reworked review item (until approval).
 planning: reviews need time in project plan; analysis: improve development and review process.

Review Rules (Ludewig and Lichter, 2013)

- (i) moderator organises, invites to, conducts review,
 (ii) the review session is limited to 2 hours if needed: more sessions
- (iii) moderator may terminate review if conduction not possible (inputs, preparation, or people missing).

- (iv) the review item is under review, not the author(s), reviewers choose their wording accordingly, authors neither defend themselves nor the review item,
- (vi) style issues (outside fixed conventions) are not discussed, (v) roles are not mixed up, the moderator does not act as reviewer
- (vii) the review team is not supposed to develop solutions, issues are not noted in form of tasks for the author(s).
- (viii) each reviewer gets the opportunity to present her/his findings appropriately,
- (ix) reviewers need to reach consensus on issues, consensus is noted down,
- (x) issues are classified as: critical (review unusable for purpose), major (usability severely affected), minor (usability hardly affected), good (no problem).
- (xi) review team declares: accept without changes, accept with changes, do not accept.
 (xii) protocol is signed by all participants.

Weaker and Stronger Variants

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Review

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Design and Code Inspection (Fagan, 1976, 1986)
 deluxe variant of review,
 approx. 50% more time, approx. 50% more faults found.

57/65

Review

Structured Walkthrough

simple variant of review: developer moderates walkthrough-session, presents arefact, reviewer
pose (prepared or spontaneous) questions, issues are noted down,
variants with or without preparation (do reviewers see the arefact before the session?)
 less effort, less effective.

disadvantages: unclear reponsibilities; "salesman"-author may trick reviewers.

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Weaker and Stronger Variants

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Careful Reading ('Durchsicht')

Comment ('Stellungnahme')

colleague(s) of developer read artefacts,
 developer considers feedback,

done by developer.
 recommendation: "away from screen" (use print-out or different device and situation)

Structured Walkthrough

advantage: low organisational effort; disadvantages: choice of colleagues may be biased; no protocol; consideration of comments at discretion of developer.

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 variants: with or without preparation (do reviewes see the artefact before the session?)
 less effort, less effective.

Structured Walkthrough

advantage: low organisational effort; disadvantages: choice of colleagues may be biased; no protocol; consideration of comments at discretion of developer.

Comment ('Stellungnahme')

colleague(s) of developer read artefacts,
 developer considers feedback,

• Design and Code Inspection (Fagan, 1976, 1986) deluxe variant of review,
 approx. 50% more time, approx. 50% more faults found.

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57/65

- Careful Reading ('Durchsicht')
- done by developer,
 recommendation: "away from screen" (use print-out or different device and situation)
- Comment ('Stellungnahme')
- colleague(s) of developer read artefacts,
 developer considers feedback,
- advantage: low organisational effort; disadvantages: clocke of colleagues may be biased; no protocol; consideration of comments at discretion of developer.

 Structured Walkthrough
- simple variant of review: developer moderates walkthrough-session, presents artifact, reviewer
 pose (prepared or spontaneous) questions, issues are noted down,
 variants; with or whitout peparation (do reviewes set the artifact before the session?)
 less effort, less effective.

disadvantages: unclear reponsibilities; "salesman"-author may trick reviewers.

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Concluding Discussion

Techniques Revisited

Static Checking Verification	Review	Runtime- Verification	Test		
	×	V	S	auto- matic	
	×	9	V	prove "can run"	
	×	<	•	tookhain considered	
	?	*	×	exhaus- tive	
	3	×	×	prove	
	<	•	~	partial results	
	3	3	•	entry cost	

- Woohnesses:

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 **no results on actual execution, toolchain not reviewed:

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 **human readers may overlook errors; usually not amining at pools.

 **does (in general) not provide counter-examples, developers may deny existence of error.

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Strengths: • human readers can understand the code, may spot point errors: • reported to be highly effective; • one can stop at any time and take partial results: • intermediate entry costs, good effort/effect ratio achievable.

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Techniques Revisited

	auto- matic	prove "can run"	toolchain considered	exhaus- tive	prove	partial results	entry cost
Test	3	V	~	×	×	•	<
Runtime- Verification							
Review							
Static Checking							
V-if							

- Strengths:
 Strengths:
 spatial prosts; frogram not campletely botion, "can run" (or positive sonatios);
 angative tar poves; frogram not completely botion," can run" (or positive sonatios);
 final product is examined, that toologish and platform considered;
 sons can stop at any time and take partial results;
 one can stop at any time and take partial results;
 five, simple test case are usually easy to obtain;
 provides reproducible counter-examplets (good starting point for repair).

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Techniques Revisited

	auto- matic	"can run"	toolchain considered	exhaus- tive	prove	partial results	entry cost
Test	<u>?</u>	~	~	×	×	V	V
Runtime-	<	Ŝ	<	*	×	<	Ŝ
Verification							
Review	×	×	×	3	3	•	3
Static	<	*	×	<	3	<	*
Verification							

V	×	V	(۲	auto- matic
×	×	3	~	prove "can run"
×	×	~	V	toolchain considered
V	3	(×)	×	exhaus- tive
3	?	×	×	prove
V	~	V	V	partial results
*	(、)	3	•	entry cost

- Strengths:

 there are (commercial), fully automatic tools (lint, Coverity, Polyspace, etc.);

 some tools are complete (relative to assumptions on language semantics, platform, etc.);

 can be faster than testing (at the price of many false positives);

 one can stop at any time and take partial results.

 Weaknesses:

- no estalts on actual execution, toolchain not reviewed;
 can be very resource consuming (if exh false positives warred);
 many false positives can be very amonying to developers (if fast checks warred);
 distinguish false from true positives can be challenging;
 configuring the tools (to limit false positives) can be challenging.

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Techniques Revisited

Static Checking	Review	Runtime- Verification	Test	
		•	Ŝ	auto- matic
		(5)	<	prove "can run"
		,	<	tookhain considered
		(X)	×	exhaus- tive
		×	×	prove
		•	۲	partial results
		3	<	entry

- Strengths:

 fully automatic (once observers are in plue);

 provides countre-example, not necessarily reproducible;

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 (nearly) final product is examined, thus toolchain and platform considered;

 one can stop at any time and take partial results;

 assert-statements have a very good effort/effect ratio.

- any negatively lifest performance;
 code is changed in popular may ody una because of the observers;
 completeness depends on usage, may also be vasity incomplete, so no correctness proofs;
 combutuding observers for complex properties may be difficult, one needs to learn how to construct observers.

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Techniques Revisited

Verification	Static Checking	Review	Runtime- Verification	Test	
Ŝ	V	×	V	(v)	auto- matic
×	(x)	×	3	V	prove "can run"
×	×	×	~	•	tookhain considered
<	<	3	*	×	exhaus- tive
<	Ŝ	3	×	×	prove
*	<	<	,	<	partial results
×	*	3	3	<	entry cost

- Stroughts:

 some tool support satishide (few commercial tools);

 complete (relative to assumptions on language semantics, platform, etc.);

 thus can provide correctness proofs;

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 can prove convertess for multiple language semantics and platforms at a time;

 each be more efficient than other techniques.

 The continuous primeralities results, "Tall of a proof" may not a life any useful conclusions;

 earthy cost high; significant training is useful to know how to deal with tool ilmitations;

 proving things, difficult, failing of find a proof deep not allow any useful conclusion;

 either negatives (troden program "proved" correct) hard to detect.

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Concluding Recommendations

 Not having at least one (systematic) test for each feature is (grossly?) negligent. IOW: without at least one test for each feature, it is not software engineering.

General Guidelines: Do's and Don'ts

changes are particularly error-prone, should not happen "en passant" in examination,

fixing flaws during examination may cause them to go uncounted in the statistics (which we need for all kinds of estimation),

Do not stop examination when first error is detected.

roles developer and examinor are different anyway: an examinor fixing flaws would violate the role assignment.

Do not use special examination versions for examination.
 (Test-hamess, stubs, etc. can be used; yet may have errors which may undermine results.)

Clear: Examination can (and should) be aborted if the examined program is not executable at all.

Do not modify the artefact under examination during examinatin.

changes/corrections during examination:
 in the end unclear what exactly has been examined ("moving target"),
 (results need to be uniquely traceable to one artefact version.)

fundamental flaws sometimes easier to detect with a complete picture of unsuccessful/successful tests,

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In particular: Do not switch (fine grained) between examination and debugging.

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So All Hope is Lost...? Seems like computer systems more or less inevitably have errors.

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 So why does my (heavily computerised) Airbus fly at all? Seems like computer systems more or less inevitably have errors.

Firstly, acrospace software maybe has the lowest error rate of all softwares due to very careful development, very thorough analysis (e.g. fault tree analysis), and strong regulatory obligations ("no proof of correctness, no take-off").
Plus: classical engineering wisdom for high reliability: Redundancy.
Highly-critical components may be present 3-times redundant, developed by 3 different teams, compiled by 3 different compilers, numbig on 3 different platforms....

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And why does my (heavily computerised) car, infusion pump, etc. not do harm?
 Again, classical engineering wisdom for high reliability: Run-time monitoring.

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A dependable system is one you can depend on — that is, you can place your trust in it.

Proposal: Dependability Cases (Jackson, 2009)

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- Proposed Approach:

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A dependable system is one you can depend on — that is, you can place your trust in it.

identify the critical requirements, and determine what level of confidence is needed.
 Most systems do also have non-critical requirements.

Construct a dependability case:

an argument, that the software, in concert with other components, establishes the critical properties.

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- A dependable system is one you can depend on that is, you can place your trust in it.
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- auditable: can (easily) be evaluated by third-puty certifier.
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IOW: "Developers [should] express the critical properties and make an explicit argument that the system satisfies them."

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 ease, about one claim full correctines [...] based on monochastive testing; aboutd not make materiated seamptions on independence of component failures; etc.

(As opposed to, e.g. requiring term coverage (which is usually not exhaustive), or requiring only coding conventions and procedure models, which may support, but do not prove dependability.)

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