# Softwaretechnik / Software-Engineering


## Lecture 18: Runtime Verification, Review & Wrapup

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## Recall: Three Basic Directions



# Topic Area Code Quality Assurance: Content

Content

VL15 • Introduction and Vocabulary
VL16 • Limits of Software Testing Other Approaches

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 Statement-, banch-, term-coverage. Runtime Verification

-(\* Test
-(\* Runtime-Verification
-(\* Review
-(\* Static Checking
-(\* Formal Verification

Dependability

Reviews
 Reviews
 Review procedure
 Review procedure
 Stronger and weaker variants

 Do's and Don'ts in Code QA Code QA Techniques Revisited

Runtime-Verification
 Runtime-Verification
 Runtime-Verification
 Runtime-Verification
 Runtime-Verification
 Runtime-Verification

Run-Time Verification

## Run-Time Verification: Idea

- $\bullet$  Assume, there is a function f in software S with the following specification:
- $\bullet$  Computation paths of S may look like this:
- $\sigma_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} \sigma_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha_2} \sigma_2 \cdots \xrightarrow{\alpha_{m-1}} \sigma_n \xrightarrow{call \ f} \sigma_{n+1} \cdots \sigma_m \xrightarrow{f \ returns} \sigma_{m+1} \cdots$
- Idea: create software S' by extending S by implementations of check<sub>p</sub> and check<sub>q</sub>.
  - Assume there are functions check, and check,
     which check whether p and q hold at the current program state.
     and which do not modify the program state (except for program counter).
- $\bullet \;\; {\sf For} \; S',$  obtain computation paths like: (iii) call check<sub>g</sub> right after entering f.
   (iii) call check<sub>g</sub> right before returning from f.
- $\sigma_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} \sigma_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha_2} \sigma_2 \cdots \xrightarrow{\alpha_{n-1}} \sigma_n \xrightarrow{\operatorname{cal} f} \sigma_{n+1} \xrightarrow{\operatorname{check}_{p_1}} \sigma'_{n+1} \cdots \sigma_m \xrightarrow{\operatorname{check}_{q_n}} \sigma'_m \xrightarrow{f \text{ returns}} \sigma_{m+1} \cdots$
- If  $check_p$  and  $check_q$  notify us of violations of p or q, then we are notified of f violating its specification when running  $\underline{S}'$  (= at run-time).

## Run-Time Verification: Example





int main() {
 sakite (true) {
 int x = read\_number();
 int y = read\_number();
 int y = read\_number();
 verify\_sum( x, y, sum );
 display(sum);
}

# A Very Useful Special Case: Assertions

Assertions At Work

The abstract f-example from run-time verification:

msert(p);

• Compute the width of a progress bar - window-left

- Maybe the simplest instance of runtime verification: Assertions.
   Available in standard libraries of many programming languages (C. C++, Java....).
- For example, the C standard library manual reads:



In C code, assert can be disabled in production code (-D NDEBUG).

assert ( 0 < progress && progress < 100k; // extremal cases already trea assert ( window\_left <= r && r <= window\_night ); /\* post-condition \*/ release r) el progres\_ba\_width( ist progress, ist window\_left, ist window\_right )
ssert(window\_left <= window\_right ); /\* pre-condition \*/
/\* freat special cases 0 and 500 \*/

### More Complex Run-Time Verification: LSC Observers THE PARTY OF THE P SEE 28

## Run-Time Verification: Discussion

Assertions At Work II

Assume, we add a method set\_key() to class TreeNode:

Recall the structure model with Proto-OCL constraint from Exercise Sheet 4.

- During development, assertions for pre/post conditions and intermediate invariants are an extremely powerful tool with a very attractive gain/effort ratio (low effort, high gain).
- Assentina effectively work as site-guard against unexpected use of functions and regression, e.g. during later maintenances or efficiency improvement.
   Can serve as formal (support of) documentation

  Their reader, at this point in the program I expect condition expr to hold, because..."

### Development- vs. Release Versions:

- Common practice:
- development version with run-time verification enabled (d. as sert(3)).
   release version without run-time verification.

Use java -ea ... to enable assertion checking (disabled by default).
 (cf. https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/technotes/guides/language/assert.html)

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We can check consistency with the Proto-OCL constraint at runtime by using assertions.

private int key:

TreeNoode parent, leftChild; rightChild;

public int get\_key() ( return key; )

public void set\_key( int new\_key; )

key = new\_key;

a sakic word set\_key( int new\_key /: a new\_key ); }
assert ( leftChild == wull || new\_key <= leftChild get\_key() );
assert ( rightChild == wull || new\_key <= rightChild .get\_key() );

If run-time verification is enabled in a release version.

If some should reminate agracefully as possible (e.g. try to save data).

If some information from asset and faller of possible for future analysis.

See when information from asset and faller of possible for future analysis.

Resk, with had lack the schware only behaves well because of the run-time verification code...

Then deabling run-time verification "native for behaves, and the schware some verification may significantly slow down the of hware, so needs to be disabled...

### Content

 Reviews

-(\* Roles and artefacts
-(\* Review procedure
-(\* Stronger and weaker variants Do's and Don'ts in Code QA

-(\* Test
-(\* Runtime-Verification
-(\* Review
-(\* Static Checking
-(\* Formal Verification

Code QA Techniques Revisited

Dependability

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Review

Review Rules (Ludewig and Lichter, 2013)

Review Procedure Over Time

a review is triggered, e.g., by a submission to the revision control system: the moderator investigation, and invitation, and states review missions.

review session:
reviewers report,
evaluate, and
document issues;
resolve open
questions.

Reviewers re-assess reworked review item (until approval is declared).

(iv) The review leen is under review. not the author(s). Reviewers choose their words accordingly. Authors neither defend themselves nor the review item. (iii) The review session is limited to 2 hours.If needed: organise more sessions. (ii) The moderator may terminate the review if conduction is not possible, e.g., due to in-puts, preparation, or people missing. (v) Roles are not mixed up, e.g., the moderato does not act as reviewer.
 (Exception: author may write transcript.) (i) The moderator organises the review, issues invitations, supervises the review session. Style issues (outside fixed conventions) are not discussed. (vii) The review team is not supposed to detable position control down in form of table
for the authority.

(viii) Each reviewe gast the opportunity to
present her/his findings appropriately.

(vii) Reviewers need to each consensus on esees, consensus is noted down. (c) Issues are classified as:

«Official (reservants had for purposed,
» major total file promenty affected,
» major total file promenty affected,
» more (adalative promenty and official common declares.

« accept without changes.
« accept with changes.
« accept with changes. (xii) The protocol is signed by all participants

Stronger and Weaker Review Variants


Design and Code Inspection (Fagen, 1976, 1986)
 deluxe variant of review.
 approx. 50% more time, approx. 50% more errors found.

Structured Walkfrough
 simple valant of review
 developer more started; i.
 reviewer pose (expansed or spontaneous) questions,
 is suice are noted down.

 advantage low organisational effort.
 disadvantage: choice of collegues may be biased: no protocol: consideration of comments at discretion of developer.
 Careful Reading ('Durchsicht) → disadvantages: unclear reponsibilities: "sale sman"-developer may trick reviewers. Comment (Stellungnahme) Variation point: do reviewers see the artefact before the session?
less effort, less effective.

done by developer.
recommendation: "away from screen" (use print-out or different device and situation) XX spak programming (\*\*)

Reviews



Input to Review Session:

Review item: can be every closed, human-readable part of software (documentation, module, test data, installation manual, etc.)

The review team consists of everybody but the author(s).

(Social aspect it is an artefact which is earnined not the human which is earnined not the human which is earnined not the human which ceated to earnine abcuments need to enable an assessment (requirements specification, guidelines (e.g. coding comentions), calalogue of questions ("all variables intailised"), etc.)

Roles

Ro

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Some Final, General Guidelines

Do's and Don'ts in Code Quality Assurance

Avoid using special examination versions for examination.

(Test-harness, stubs, etc. may have errors which may cause false positives and (!) negatives.

Content

Avoid to stop examination when the first error is detected.

Clear Examination should be aborted if the examined program is not executable at all.

Do not modify the artefact under examination during examinatin.

otherwise, it is unclear what exactly has been examined ("moving target"),
(examination results need to be uniquely traceable to one artefact version.)

fundamental lawa are sometimes easier to detect with a complete perhaps of the control tests. With a complete perhaps of the control tests, with a complete perhaps of the control tests. It is the control tests of the control tests. The control tests of the

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 Do's and Don'ts in Code QA Code QA Techniques Revisited

Runtime-Verification
 (e) Idea
 (e) Assertions
 (e) LSC-Observers

scoles developer and examinor are different anyway: an examinor fixing flaws would violate the role assignment

Do not switch (fine grained) between examination and debugging.

Techniques Revisited

Verification	Static Checking	Review	Runtime- Verification	Test	
				3	auto- matic
				V	prove "can run"
				•	todchain considered
				×	exhaus- tive
				X	prove
				V	partial results
				<	entry

Code Quality Assurance Techniques Revisited

- Strengths:

  Streng

(Inmost case) warly incomplete, thus no pools of correctness:
 creating test cases for complex functions (or complex conditions) and be difficult:
 maintenance of many, complex test cases be challenging;
 executing many tests may need substantial time (but: can sometimes be run in paalled);

### Techniques Revisited

Verification	Static Checking	Review	Verification	•	Test (V)	matic n		
				?	v v		prove "can toolchain	
				<u>*</u>	×	F	exhaus-	
				×	×	correct	prove	
				,	V	results	partial	
				Ŝ	•	cost	entry	

- fully automatic (once observers are in place):
   provides counter-example:
   inostly limit product is examined, thus toolchain and platform considered:
   one can stop at any time and take partial results:
   autorit statements have a wary good effort fulfect ratio.

counter-wardes not necessary reproducible
 may regardey lafet; performance
 code is changed, program may only run because of the observers
 completness deproducin uses, on correctness proofs,
 may also be a wally successful on no correctness proofs,
 constructing observes for complex properties may be a difficult,
 constructing observes for complex properties may be a difficult,
 constructing observes for complex properties may be a difficult,
 constructing observes for complex properties may be a difficult.

### Techniques Revisited

	matic	run' can	considered	ive	correct	results	cost
Test	S	~	,	×	×	V	~
Runtime-	•	Ē	,	( <b>x</b> )	×	•	Ŝ
Verification							
Review	X	×	×	( <b>v</b> )	Ŝ	V	Ŝ
Static Checking							
Verification							

- Strengths:

  I human readers can undestand the code, may spot point errors:

  reported to be highly effective.

  reported to be highly effective.

  one can stop at any time and the partial results;

  intermediate early code.

  good of four fefect and achievable.

- no tool support:
   no restliction natural execution toolchain not reviewed
   innum readers may overlook errors usually not aiming at proofs,
   does in general not provide counter-examples,
   developers may dany existence of error.

### Techniques Revisited

Verification	Static Checking V	Review	Verification	Puntime-	Test (V)	auto- matic
	( <b>X</b> )	×	(*)		~	prove "can
	×	×	•		•	todichain considered
	<	Ŝ	(m)	(4)	×	exhaus- tive
	3	<u>S</u>	,	٨	×	correct
	<	,	•	,	,	partial results
	( <b>X</b> )	3	W )		•	entry

- no results on actual execution, toolchain not reviewed:
   can be very resource comanning (if the false positives wanted),
   cap, coder may resel be of 'designed to stade analysis:
   a many false positives can be very annoying to developers (if fast checks wanted):
   elistinguish false from the positives can be challenging;
   elistinguish false from the positives can be challenging;
   configuring the tools (to timit false positives) can be challenging.
- there are (commercial), fully automatic tools (fint, Coverity, Polyspace, etc.)
   some tools are complete (relative to assumptions on language semantics, platform, etc.)
   can be flatfor than testing.
   one can stop at any time and take partial results.

# Proposal: Dependability Cases (Jackson, 2009)

A dependable system is one you can depend on – that is, you can place your trust in it.

"Developers [should] express the critical properties and make an explicit argument that the system satisfies them."

quality assurance – (1) A planned and systematic pattern of all actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that an item or product conforms to established technical requirements.

Quality Assurance — Concluding Discussion

- Proposed Approach:

   Identify the critical requirements, and determine what level of confidence is needed.
- Most systems do also have non-critical requirements.

  Construct a dependability case:
- an argument, that the software, in concert with other components, establishes the critical properties
- The case should be
   auditable: can (easily) be evaluated by third-party certifier.

- complete no hode in the agument, any assurations that are not latefuled
  should be notified (e.g. assumptions on Complete on personal objects etc.)
  sound as globuld not claim full convertines (...) based on nonechastiste testing
  should not make unwampted assurations on independence of component failures etc.

### Techniques Revisited

Static Checking	Review	Verification	Runtime-	Test	
~	×		ς.	(V)	auto- matic
( <b>x</b> )	×		Ŝ	V	prowe "can run"
×	×		ς.	V	toolchain considered
,	(V)		<u>×</u>	×	exhaus- tive
Ŝ	(		×	×	prove
,	~		ς.	V	partial results
<b>×</b>	Ŝ		Ŝ	V	entry cost

- some tod support available free commercial tookly
  e complete feature to summitions on impage semantics, platform etc.):
   that can provide connectness proofit:
   can provide connectness proofit:
   can provide connectness promiting the supple semantics and platforms at a time;
   can be more efficient than other techniques.

- no seuls onactual execution, tookhain not reviewed;
   or trump intermediate results: "Maid to apport may not allow any useful conclusions;
   entry cet light, significant triaming is useful to brown how to deal with tool inhalation;
   powing through is challenging failing to find a pood does not allow any useful conclusions.
   faller regulatives (boken program in proved: correct) had to detect.

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### Critical Systems

# Still, it seems like computer systems more or less inevitably have errors.





... do modem cars drive at all?

... do modern planes fly at all?
 (i) very cardid development.
 (ii) very through analysis.
 (iii) sery through analysis.
 (iii) serve through analysis.
 Plus classical engineering valoriom for high eliability, ille redundancy.

Transfer d. 2009

(i) careful development,
(ii) thorough analysis,
(iii) regulatory obligations.
Plus: classical engineering wisdom
for high reliability, like monitoring.





# Tell Them What You've Told Them...

- Runtime Verification
- (as the name suggests) checks properties at program run-time.
   a good pinch of assert's can be a valuable safe-guard against
- regressions,
  usage outside specification,
  etc.
- Review (structured examination of artefacts by humans) and serve as formal documentation of assumptions.
- lead programmer reviews all commits from team members.

  literature reports good effort/effect ratio achievable. (mild variant) advocated in the XP approach.
- All approaches to code quality assurance have their

References

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Dependability Cases
 an (auditable, complete, sound) argument, that a software has the critical properties.

advantages and drawbacks.
 Which to use? It depends!

References

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to reduce errors in program development. IBM Systems Journal.

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Contents of the Course



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What Did We Do?











18 Lectures on Software Engineering

Communication Co

Contract Orange

RE, Desg., QA

Looking Back:











































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












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That's Today's Software Engineering — More or Less...

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| Incompanies |

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Expectations Cont'd 

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Coming Soon to Your Local Lecture Hall...

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Thursday, 2016-07-21, 1200 to 1400:

Plenary Tutorial 6 & Questions Session

in 101-0-026 (right here)

41) a