

# Lecture 6: Formal Methods for Requirements Engineering


2019-05-16

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## Topic Area Requirements Engineering: Content



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- Documents
  - Dictionary, Specification
- Requirements Specification Languages
  - Natural Language
- (Basic) Decision Tables
  - Syntax, Semantics
- ...for Requirements Specification
- ...for Requirements Analysis
  - Completeness, Useless Rules,
  - Determinism
- Domain Modelling
  - Conflict Axiom,
  - Relative Completeness, Vacuous Rules,
  - Conflict Relation
- Collecting Semantics
- Discussion

Logic

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## Requirements Documents

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
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**specification** — A document that specifies,

- in a complete, precise, verifiable manner,
- the
- requirements, design, behavior,  
or other characteristics of a system or component,

and, often, the procedures for determining whether these provisions have been satisfied. **IEEE 610.12 (1990)**

**software requirements specification (SRS)** — Documentation of the essential requirements (functions, performance, design constraints, and attributes) of the software and its external interfaces. **IEEE 610.12 (1990)**



# Structure of a Requirements Document: Example

1 INTRODUCTION	5 GENERAL CONSTRAINTS AND REQUIREMENTS
1.1 Purpose	5.1 Standards and Regulations
1.2 Acronyms and Definitions	5.2 Strategic Constraints
1.3 References	5.3 Hardware
1.4 User Characteristics	5.4 Software
2 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS	5.5 Compatibility
2.1 Function Set 1	5.6 Cost Constraints
2.2 etc.	5.7 Time Constraints
3 REQUIREMENTS TO EXTERNAL INTERFACES	5.8 etc.
3.1 User Interfaces	6 PRODUCT QUALITY REQUIREMENTS
3.2 Interfaces to Hardware	6.1 Availability, Reliability, Robustness
3.3 Interfaces to Software Products / Software / Firmware	6.2 Security
3.4 Communication Interfaces	6.3 Maintainability
4 REQUIREMENTS REGARDING TECHNICAL DATA	6.4 Portability
4.1 Volume Requirements	6.5 etc.
4.2 Performance	7 FURTHER REQUIREMENTS
4.3 etc.	7.1 System Operation
	7.2 Customisation
	7.3 Requirements of Internal Users

(Ludewig and Lichter, 2013) based on (IEEE, 1998)

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## Dictionary

- Requirements analysis should be based on a **dictionary**.
- A **dictionary** comprises definitions and clarifications of **terms** that are relevant to the project and of which different people (in particular customer and developer) may have different understandings before agreeing on the dictionary.
- Each **entry** in the **dictionary** should provide the following information:

- **term** and **synonyms** (in the sense of the requirements specification),
- **meaning** (definition, explanation),
- **delimitations** (where **not** to use this terms),
- **validness** (in time, in space, ...),
- **denotation**, unique identifiers, ...,
- **open questions** not yet resolved,
- **related terms**, cross references.

**Note:** entries for terms that **seemed** "crystal clear" at first sight are **not uncommon**.

- All work on requirements should, as far as possible, be done **using terms from the dictionary** consistently and consequently.  
The dictionary should in particular be **negotiated with the customer** and used in communication (if not possible, at least developers should stick to dictionary terms).
- **Note:** do not mix up **real-world/domain** terms with ones only "living" in the software.

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## Example: Wireless Fire Alarm System

The loss of the ability of the system to transmit a signal from a component to the central unit is detected in less than 300 seconds and displayed at the central unit within 100 seconds thereafter.

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
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## Dictionary Example

### Example: Wireless Fire Alarm System

- During a project on designing a highly reliable, EN-54-25 conforming wireless communication protocol, we had to learn that the relevant components of a fire alarm system are
  - terminal participants** (heat/smoke sensors and manual indicators),
  - repeaters** (a non-terminal participant),
  - and **a central unit** (not a participant).
- Repeaters and central unit are technically very similar, but need to be distinguished to understand requirements. The **dictionary** explains these terms.



(Arenis et al., 2014)

### Excerpt from the dictionary (ca. 50 entries in total):

**Part** A part of a fire alarm system is either a **participant** or a **central unit**.

**Repeater** A repeater is a **participant** which accepts messages for the **central unit** from other **participants**, or messages from the **central unit** to other **participants**.

**Central Unit** A central unit is a **part** which receives messages from different assigned **participants**, assesses the messages, and reacts, e.g. by forwarding to persons or optical/acoustic signalling devices.

**Terminal Participant** A terminal participant is a **participant** which is not a **repeater**. Each terminal participant consists of exactly one wireless communication module and devices which provide sensor and/or signalling functionality.

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## Requirements Specification Languages

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**specification language** — A language, often a machine-processible combination of natural and formal language, used to express the requirements, design, behavior, or other characteristics of a system or component.

For example, a design language or requirements specification language. Contrast with: programming language; query language. **IEEE 610.12 (1990)**






**requirements specification language** — A specification language with special constructs and, sometimes, verification protocols, used to develop, analyze, and document hardware or software requirements. **IEEE 610.12 (1990)**

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## Natural Language Specification *(Ludewig and Lichter, 2013) based*

on *(Rupp and die SOPHISTen, 2009)*

	rule	explanation, example
R1	State each requirement in <b>active voice</b> .	Name the actors, indicate whether the user or the system does something. Not "the item is deleted".
R2	Express processes by <b>full verbs</b> .	Not "is", "has", but "reads", "creates"; full verbs require information which describe the process more precisely. Not "when data is consistent" but "after program P has checked consistency of the data".
R3	Discover <b>incompletely defined verbs</b> .	In "the component raises an error", ask whom the message is addressed to.
 R4	Discover <b>incomplete conditions</b> .	Conditions of the form "if-else" need descriptions of the if- and the then-case.
 R5	Discover <b>universal quantifiers</b> . 	Are sentences with "never", "always", "each", "any", "all" really universally valid? Are "all" really all or are there exceptions.
R6	Check <b>nominalisations</b> .	Nouns like "registration" often hide complex processes that need more detailed descriptions; the verb "register" raises appropriate questions: who, where, for what?
R7	Recognise and refine <b>unclear substantives</b> . 	Is the substantive used as a generic term or does it denote something specific? Is "user" generic or is a member of a specific classes meant?
R8	Clarify <b>responsibilities</b> .	If the specification says that something is "possible", "impossible", or "may", "should", "must" happen, <u>clarify who is enforcing or prohibiting the behaviour.</u>
 R9	Identify <b>implicit assumptions</b> .	Terms ("the firewall") that are not explained further often hint to implicit assumptions (here: there seems to be a firewall).

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Natural language requirements can be (tried to be) written as an instance of the **pattern** " $\langle A \rangle \langle B \rangle \langle C \rangle \langle D \rangle \langle E \rangle \langle F \rangle$ ." (German grammar) where

<i>A</i>	clarifies when and under what conditions the activity takes place
<i>B</i>	is MUST (obligation), SHOULD (wish), or WILL (intention); also: MUST NOT (forbidden)
<i>C</i>	is either "the system" or the concrete name of a (sub-)system
<i>D</i>	one of three possibilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• "does", description of a system activity,</li><li>• "offers", description of a function offered by the system to somebody,</li><li>• "is able if", usage of a function offered by a third party, under certain conditions</li></ul>
<i>E</i>	extensions, in particular an object
<i>F</i>	the actual process word (what happens)

(Rupp and die SOPHISTen, 2009)

## Example:

After office hours (= *A*), the system (= *C*) should (= *B*) offer to the operator (= *D*) a backup (= *F*) of all new registrations to an external medium (= *E*).

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## Other Pattern Example: RFC 2119

Network Working Group Request for Comments: 2119 BCP: 14 Category: Best Current Practice	S. Bradner Harvard University March 1997
<u>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</u>	
Status of this Memo	
This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.	
Abstract	
In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. Authors who follow these guidelines should incorporate this phrase near the beginning of their document:	
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.	
Note that the force of these words is modified by the requirement level of the document in which they are used.	
1. <b>MUST</b> This word, or the terms "REQUIRED" or "SHALL", mean that the definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.	
2. <b>MUST NOT</b> This phrase, or the phrase "SHALL NOT", mean that the definition is an absolute prohibition of the specification.	
3. <b>SHOULD</b> This word, or the adjective "RECOMMENDED", mean that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a particular item, but the full implications must be understood and carefully weighed before choosing a different course.	
4. <b>SHOULD NOT</b> This phrase, or the phrase "NOT RECOMMENDED" mean that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances when the particular behavior is acceptable or even useful, but the full implications should be understood and the case carefully weighed before implementing any behavior described with this label.	
Bradner	Best Current Practice [Page 1]

RFC 2119	RFC Key Words
5. <b>MAY</b> This word, or the adjective "OPTIONAL", mean that a particular marketplace requires it or because the vendor it enhances the product while another vendor may omit the implementation which does not include a particular option prepared to interoperate with another implementation which include the option, though perhaps with reduced functionality same vein an implementation which does include a particular MUST be prepared to interoperate with another implementation does not include the option (except, of course, for the option provides.)	
6. Guidance in the use of these Imperatives	
Imperatives of the type defined in this memo must be used and sparingly. In particular, they MUST only be used when actually required for interoperation or to limit behavior potential for causing harm (e.g., limiting retransmission example, they must not be used to try to impose a particular on implementors where the method is not required for interoperability.	
7. Security Considerations	
These terms are frequently used to specify behavior with implications. The effects on security of not implementing SHOULD, or doing something the specification says MUST NOT be done may be very subtle. Document authors should not to elaborate the security implications of not following recommendations or requirements as most implementors will had the benefit of the experience and discussion that particular specification.	
8. Acknowledgments	
The definitions of these terms are an amalgam of definitions from a number of RFCs. In addition, suggestions have been incorporated from a number of people including Robert Ullmann, Narten, Neal McBurnett, and Robert Elz.	



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**Definition.** [Bjørner and Havelund (2014)]

A method is called **formal method**

if and only if its techniques and tools can be explained in mathematics.

### Example:

If a method includes a specification language (as a tool), then that language has

- a **formal syntax**,
- a **formal semantics**, and
- a **formal proof system**.

## Formal, Rigorous, or Systematic Development

"The **techniques** of a formal method help

- **construct** a specification, and/or
- **analyse** a specification, and/or
- **transform (refine)** one (or more) specification(s) into a **program**.

The **techniques** of a formal method, (besides the specification languages) are typically software packages that help developers use the techniques and other tools.

The aim of developing software, either

- ▶ **formally** (all arguments are formal) OR
- ▶ **rigorously** (some arguments are made and they are formal) OR
- ▶ **systematically** (some arguments are made on a form that can be made formal)


is to (be able to) reason in a precise manner about properties of what is being developed." (Bjørner and Havelund, 2014)

## Decision Tables

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### Decision Tables: Example



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## Decision Table Syntax

- Let  $C$  be a set of **conditions** and  $A$  be a set of **actions** s.t.  $C \cap A = \emptyset$ .
- A **decision table**  $T$  **over**  $C$  **and**  $A$  is a labelled  $(m+k) \times n$  matrix

T: decision table		$r_1$	$\dots$	$r_n$
$c_1$	description of condition $c_1$	$v_{1,1}$	$\dots$	$v_{1,n}$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\ddots$	$\vdots$
$c_m$	description of condition $c_m$	$v_{m,1}$	$\dots$	$v_{m,n}$
$a_1$	description of action $a_1$	$w_{1,1}$	$\dots$	$w_{1,n}$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\ddots$	$\vdots$
$a_k$	description of action $a_k$	$w_{k,1}$	$\dots$	$w_{k,n}$

- where
  - $c_1, \dots, c_m \in C$ ,
  - $a_1, \dots, a_k \in A$ ,
  - $v_{1,1}, \dots, v_{m,n} \in \{-, \times, *\}$  and
  - $w_{1,1}, \dots, w_{k,n} \in \{-, \times\}$ .

- Columns  $(v_{1,i}, \dots, v_{m,i}, w_{1,i}, \dots, w_{k,i}), 1 \leq i \leq n$ , are called **rules**,
- $r_1, \dots, r_n$  are **rule names**.
- $(v_{1,i}, \dots, v_{m,i})$  is called **premise** of rule  $r_i$ ,
- $(w_{1,i}, \dots, w_{k,i})$  is called **effect** of  $r_i$ .

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## Decision Table Semantics

Each rule  $r \in \{r_1, \dots, r_n\}$  of table  $T$

T: decision table		$r_1$	$\dots$	$r_n$
$c_1$	description of condition $c_1$	$v_{1,1}$	$\dots$	$v_{1,n}$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\ddots$	$\vdots$
$c_m$	description of condition $c_m$	$v_{m,1}$	$\dots$	$v_{m,n}$
$a_1$	description of action $a_1$	$w_{1,1}$	$\dots$	$w_{1,n}$
$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\vdots$	$\ddots$	$\vdots$
$a_k$	description of action $a_k$	$w_{k,1}$	$\dots$	$w_{k,n}$

is assigned to a **propositional logical formula**  $\mathcal{F}(r)$  over signature  $C \cup A$  as follows:

- Let  $(v_1, \dots, v_m)$  and  $(w_1, \dots, w_k)$  be premise and effect of  $r$ .
- Then

$$\mathcal{F}(r) := \underbrace{F(v_1, c_1) \wedge \dots \wedge F(v_m, c_m)}_{=: \mathcal{F}_{pre}(r)} \wedge \underbrace{F(w_1, a_1) \wedge \dots \wedge F(w_k, a_k)}_{=: \mathcal{F}_{eff}(r)}$$

where

$$F(v, x) = \begin{cases} x & , \text{if } v = \times \\ \neg x & , \text{if } v = - \\ \text{true} & , \text{if } v = * \end{cases}$$

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## Decision Table Semantics: Example

$$\mathcal{F}(r) := F(v_1, c_1) \wedge \cdots \wedge F(v_m, c_m) \\ \wedge F(v_1, a_1) \wedge \cdots \wedge F(v_k, a_k)$$

$$F(v, x) = \begin{cases} x & , \text{if } v = \times \\ \neg x & , \text{if } v = - \\ \text{true} & , \text{if } v = * \end{cases}$$

$T$		$r_1$	$r_2$	$r_3$
$c_1$		$\times$	$\times$	$-$
$c_2$		$\times$	$-$	$*$
$c_3$		$-$	$\times$	$*$
$a_1$		$\times$	$-$	$-$
$a_2$		$-$	$\times$	$-$

- $\mathcal{F}(r_1) = F(\times, c_1) \wedge F(\times, c_2) \wedge F(-, c_3) \wedge F(\times, a_1) \wedge F(-, a_2)$   
 $= \underbrace{c_1 \wedge c_2 \wedge \neg c_3 \wedge a_1 \wedge \neg a_2}_{\text{true} \wedge \text{true} \wedge \text{false} \wedge \text{true} \wedge \text{false}}$
- $\mathcal{F}(r_2) = \underbrace{c_1 \wedge \neg c_2 \wedge c_3 \wedge \neg a_1 \wedge a_2}_{\text{true} \wedge \text{false} \wedge \text{false} \wedge \text{false} \wedge \text{true}}$
- $\mathcal{F}(r_3) = \neg c_1 \wedge \text{true} \wedge \text{true} \wedge \neg a_1 \wedge \neg a_2$

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## Decision Tables as Requirements Specification

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## Yes, And?

We can use decision tables to **model** (describe or prescribe) the behaviour of **software**!

### Example:

Ventilation system of  
lecture hall 101-O-026.

*observables*

T: room ventilation		r <sub>1</sub>	r <sub>2</sub>	r <sub>3</sub>
<i>b</i>	button pressed?	x	x	—
<i>off</i>	ventilation off?	x	—	*
<i>on</i>	ventilation on?	—	x	*
<i>go</i>	start ventilation	x	—	—
<i>stop</i>	stop ventilation	—	x	—

- We can **observe** whether **button is pressed** and whether room ventilation is **on or off**, and whether (we intend to) **start ventilation** of **stop ventilation**. *{0,1}, {true, false}*
- We can model our observation by a boolean valuation  $\sigma : C \cup A \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ , e.g., set

$\sigma(b) := \text{true}$ , if button pressed now and  $\sigma(b) := \text{false}$ , if button not pressed now.

$\sigma(\text{go}) := \text{true}$ , we plan to start ventilation and  $\sigma(\text{go}) := \text{false}$ , we plan to stop ventilation.

- A valuation  $\sigma : C \cup A \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$  can be used to assign a **truth value** to a propositional formula  $\varphi$  over  $C \cup A$ .  
As usual, we write  $\sigma \models \varphi$  iff  $\varphi$  evaluates to **true** under  $\sigma$  (and  $\sigma \not\models \varphi$  otherwise).
- Rule formulae  $\mathcal{F}(r)$  are propositional formulae over  $C \cup A$   
thus, given  $\sigma$ , we have either  $\sigma \models \mathcal{F}(r)$  or  $\sigma \not\models \mathcal{F}(r)$ .

$$\sigma \left[ \begin{array}{l} b \mapsto 0 \\ \text{off} \mapsto 0 \\ \text{on} \mapsto 1 \\ \text{start} \mapsto 0 \\ \text{stop} \mapsto 0 \end{array} \right] \models \mathcal{F}(r_3)$$

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— 6 — 2019-05-16 — Semantics —

## Yes, And?

We can use decision tables to **model** (describe or prescribe) the behaviour of **software**!

### Example:

Ventilation system of  
lecture hall 101-O-026.

T: room ventilation		r <sub>1</sub>	r <sub>2</sub>	r <sub>3</sub>
<i>b</i>	button pressed?	x	x	—
<i>off</i>	ventilation off?	x	—	*
<i>on</i>	ventilation on?	—	x	*
<i>go</i>	start ventilation	x	—	—
<i>stop</i>	stop ventilation	—	x	—

- We can **observe** whether **button is pressed** and whether room ventilation is **on or off**, and whether (we intend to) **start ventilation** of **stop ventilation**.
- We can model our observation by a boolean valuation  $\sigma : C \cup A \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$ , e.g., set
 

$\sigma(b) := \text{true}$ , if button pressed now and  $\sigma(b) := \text{false}$ , if button not pressed now.

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- A valuation  $\sigma : C \cup A \rightarrow \mathbb{B}$  can be used to assign a **truth value** to a propositional formula  $\varphi$  over  $C \cup A$ .  
As usual, we write  $\sigma \models \varphi$  iff  $\varphi$  evaluates to **true** under  $\sigma$  (and  $\sigma \not\models \varphi$  otherwise).
- Rule formulae  $\mathcal{F}(r)$  are propositional formulae over  $C \cup A$   
thus, given  $\sigma$ , we have either  $\sigma \models \mathcal{F}(r)$  or  $\sigma \not\models \mathcal{F}(r)$ .
- Let  $\sigma$  be a model of an **observation** of  $C$  and  $A$ .  
We say,  $\sigma$  is **allowed** by **decision table**  $T$  if and only if there **exists** a rule  $r$  in  $T$  such that  $\sigma \models \mathcal{F}(r)$ .

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— 6 — 2019-05-16 — Semantics —

## Example

T: room ventilation		r <sub>1</sub>	r <sub>2</sub>	r <sub>3</sub>
b	button pressed?	×	×	—
off	ventilation off?	×	—	*
on	ventilation on?	—	×	*
go	start ventilation	×	—	—
stop	stop ventilation	—	×	—

$$\mathcal{F}(r_1) = b \wedge \text{off} \wedge \neg \text{on} \wedge \text{go} \wedge \neg \text{stop}$$

$$\mathcal{F}(r_2) = b \wedge \neg \text{off} \wedge \text{on} \wedge \neg \text{go} \wedge \text{stop}$$

$$\mathcal{F}(r_3) = \neg b \wedge \text{true} \wedge \text{true} \wedge \neg \text{go} \wedge \neg \text{stop}$$

(i) **Assume:** button pressed, ventilation off, we (only) plan to start the ventilation.

- Corresponding valuation:  $\sigma_1 = \{b \mapsto \text{true}, \text{off} \mapsto \text{true}, \text{on} \mapsto \text{false}, \text{start} \mapsto \text{true}, \text{stop} \mapsto \text{false}\}$ .
- Is our intention (to start the ventilation now) **allowed** by T? **Yes!** (Because  $\sigma_1 \models \mathcal{F}(r_1)$ )


(ii) **Assume:** button pressed, ventilation on, we (only) plan to stop the ventilation.

- Corresponding valuation:  $\sigma_2 = \{b \mapsto \text{true}, \text{off} \mapsto \text{false}, \text{on} \mapsto \text{true}, \text{start} \mapsto \text{false}, \text{stop} \mapsto \text{true}\}$ .
- Is our intention (to stop the ventilation now) allowed by T? **Yes.** (Because  $\sigma_2 \models \mathcal{F}(r_2)$ )

(iii) **Assume:** button not pressed, ventilation on, we (only) plan to stop the ventilation.

- Corresponding valuation:
- Is our intention (to stop the ventilation now) allowed by T? **No**

## Decision Tables as Specification Language




- Decision Tables can be used to **objectively** describe desired software behaviour.

• **Example:** Dear developer, please provide a program such that

- in each situation (button pressed, ventilation on/off),
- whatever the software does (action start/stop)
- is **allowed** by decision table T.

T: room ventilation		r <sub>1</sub>	r <sub>2</sub>	r <sub>3</sub>
b	button pressed?	×	×	—
off	ventilation off?	×	—	*
on	ventilation on?	—	×	*
go	start ventilation	×	—	—
stop	stop ventilation	—	×	—

## Decision Tables as Specification Language



- Decision Tables can be used to **objectively** describe desired software behaviour.
- Another Example:** Customer session at the bank:

T1: cash a cheque		r <sub>1</sub>	r <sub>2</sub>	else
c <sub>1</sub>	credit limit exceeded?	x	x	
c <sub>2</sub>	payment history ok?	x	—	
c <sub>3</sub>	overdraft < 500 €?	—	*	
a <sub>1</sub>	cash cheque	x	—	x
a <sub>2</sub>	do not cash cheque	—	x	—
a <sub>3</sub>	offer new conditions	x	—	—

(Balzer, 2009)

- clerk checks database state (yields  $\sigma$  for  $c_1, \dots, c_3$ ),
- database says: credit limit exceeded over 500 €, but payment history ok,
- clerk cashes cheque but offers new conditions (according to T1).

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## Decision Tables as Specification Language

### Requirements on Requirements Specifications

A **requirements specification** should be

- correct**
  - it correctly represents the wishes/needs of the customer,
- complete**
  - all requirements (existing in somebody's head, or a document, or ...) should be present,
- relevant**
  - things which are not relevant to the project should not be constrained,
- consistent, free of contradictions**
  - each requirement is compatible with all other requirements; otherwise the requirements are **not realisable**,
- Correctness and completeness** are defined **relative** to something which is usually only in the customer's head.
  - is **difficult** (if at all possible) to **be sure of correctness** and **completeness**.
- neutral, abstract**
  - a requirements specification does not constrain the realisation more than necessary,
- traceable, comprehensible**
  - the sources of requirements are documented, requirements are uniquely identifiable,
- testable, objective**
  - the final product can **objectively** be checked for satisfying a requirement.

- clerk checks database state (yields  $\sigma$  for  $c_1, \dots, c_3$ ),
- database says: credit limit exceeded over 500 €, but payment history ok,
- clerk cashes cheque but offers new conditions (according to T1).

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## Decision Tables for Requirements Analysis

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### Recall Once Again

#### Requirements on Requirements Specifications

A requirements specification should be

- **correct**
  - it correctly represents the wishes/needs of the customer.
- **complete**
  - all requirements (existing in somebody's head, or a document, or ...) should be present.
- **relevant**
  - things which are not relevant to the project should not be constrained.
- **consistent, free of contradictions**
  - each requirement is compatible with all other requirements; otherwise the requirements are **not realisable**.
- **Correctness and completeness** are defined **relative** to something which is usually only in the customer's head.
  - is **difficult** (if at all possible) to **be sure of correctness** and **completeness**.
- **neutral, abstract**
  - a requirements specification does not constrain the realisation more than necessary.
- **traceable, comprehensible**
  - the sources of requirements are documented, requirements are uniquely identifiable.
- **testable, objective**
  - the final product can **objectively** be checked for satisfying a requirement.

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**Definition.** [Completeness] A decision table  $T$  is called **complete** if and only if the disjunction of all rules' premises is a **tautology**, i.e. if

$$\models \bigvee_{r \in T} \mathcal{F}_{pre}(r).$$

## Tell Them What You've Told Them. . .

- **Decision Tables:** **one example** for a **formal requirements specification language** with
  - formal syntax, ✓
  - formal semantics. ✓
- Requirements analysts can use **DTs** to
  - **formally** (objectively, precisely) describe **their understanding** of requirements. Customers may need translations/explanation!
- **DT** properties like 
  - (relative) completeness, determinism,
  - uselessness,can be used to **analyse** requirements.  
The discussed DT properties are **decidable**, there can be **automatic** analysis tools.
- **Domain modelling** formalises assumptions on the context of software; for DTs:
  - conflict axioms, conflict relation,Note: wrong assumptions can have serious consequences.

## References

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