

Decision Procedures

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- Syntax and Semantics of First Order Logic (FOL)
- Semantic Tableaux for FOL
- FOL is only **semi**-decidable

⇒ Restrictions to decidable fragments of FOL

- Quantifier Free Fragment (QFF)
- QFF of Equality
- Presburger arithmetic
- (QFF of) Linear integer arithmetic
- Real arithmetic
- (QFF of) Linear real/rational arithmetic
- QFF of Recursive Data Structures
- QFF of Arrays
- Putting it all together (Nelson-Oppen).

First-Order Logic

Also called Predicate Logic or Predicate Calculus

FOL Syntax

<u>variables</u>	x, y, z, \dots
<u>constants</u>	a, b, c, \dots
<u>functions</u>	f, g, h, \dots with arity $n > 0$
<u>terms</u>	variables, constants or n-ary function applied to n terms as arguments $a, x, f(a), g(x, b), f(g(x, f(b)))$
<u>predicates</u>	p, q, r, \dots with arity $n \geq 0$
<u>atom</u>	\top, \perp , or an n-ary predicate applied to n terms
<u>literal</u>	atom or its negation $p(f(x), g(x, f(x))), \quad \neg p(f(x), g(x, f(x)))$

Note: 0-ary functions: constant
0-ary predicates: P, Q, R, \dots

quantifiers

existential quantifier $\exists x.F[x]$

“there exists an x such that $F[x]$ ”

universal quantifier $\forall x.F[x]$

“for all x , $F[x]$ ”

FOL formula literal, application of logical connectives

($\neg, \vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, \leftrightarrow$) to formulae,

or application of a quantifier to a formula

FOL formula

$$\forall x. \underbrace{(p(f(x), x) \rightarrow (\exists y. \underbrace{(p(f(g(x, y)), g(x, y)))}_G) \wedge q(x, f(x)))}_F$$

The scope of $\forall x$ is F .

The scope of $\exists y$ is G .

The formula reads:

“for all x ,
 if $p(f(x), x)$
 then there exists a y such that
 $p(f(g(x, y)), g(x, y))$ and $q(x, f(x))$ ”

- The length of one side of a triangle is less than the sum of the lengths of the other two sides

$$\forall x, y, z. \text{triangle}(x, y, z) \rightarrow \text{length}(x) < \text{length}(y) + \text{length}(z)$$

- Fermat's Last Theorem.

$$\begin{aligned} &\forall n. \text{integer}(n) \wedge n > 2 \\ &\rightarrow \forall x, y, z. \\ &\quad \text{integer}(x) \wedge \text{integer}(y) \wedge \text{integer}(z) \\ &\quad \wedge x > 0 \wedge y > 0 \wedge z > 0 \\ &\quad \rightarrow x^n + y^n \neq z^n \end{aligned}$$

For every regular Language L there is some $n \geq 0$, such that for all words $z \in L$ with $|z| \geq n$ there is a decomposition $z = uvw$ with $|v| \geq 1$ and $|uv| \leq n$, such that for all $i \geq 0$: $uv^i w \in L$.

$$\begin{aligned} \forall L. \text{regularlanguage}(L) \rightarrow \\ \exists n. \text{integer}(n) \wedge n \geq 0 \wedge \\ \forall z. z \in L \wedge |z| \geq n \rightarrow \\ \exists u, v, w. \text{word}(u) \wedge \text{word}(v) \wedge \text{word}(w) \wedge \\ z = uvw \wedge |v| \geq 1 \wedge |uv| \leq n \wedge \\ \forall i. \text{integer}(i) \wedge i \geq 0 \rightarrow uv^i w \in L \end{aligned}$$

Predicates: *regularlanguage*, *integer*, *word*, $\cdot \in \cdot$, $\cdot \leq \cdot$, $\cdot \geq \cdot$, $\cdot = \cdot$

Constants: 0, 1

Functions: $|\cdot|$ (word length), concatenation, iteration

An interpretation $I : (D_I, \alpha_I)$ consists of:

- Domain D_I
 non-empty set of values or objects
 for example $D_I =$ playing cards (finite),
 integers (countable infinite), or
 reals (uncountable infinite)
- Assignment α_I
 - each variable x assigned value $\alpha_I[x] \in D_I$
 - each n -ary function f assigned

$$\alpha_I[f] : D_I^n \rightarrow D_I$$

In particular, each constant a (0-ary function) assigned value
 $\alpha_I[a] \in D_I$

- each n -ary predicate p assigned

$$\alpha_I[p] : D_I^n \rightarrow \{\top, \perp\}$$

In particular, each propositional variable P (0-ary predicate) assigned
 truth value (\top, \perp)

$$F : p(f(x, y), z) \rightarrow p(y, g(z, x))$$

Interpretation $I : (D_I, \alpha_I)$

$$D_I = \mathbb{Z} = \{\dots, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, \dots\} \quad \text{integers}$$

$$\alpha_I[f] : D_I^2 \rightarrow D_I \quad \alpha_I[g] : D_I^2 \rightarrow D_I$$

$$(x, y) \mapsto x + y \quad (x, y) \mapsto x - y$$

$$\alpha_I[p] : D_I^2 \rightarrow \{\top, \perp\}$$

$$(x, y) \mapsto \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } x < y \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Also $\alpha_I[x] = 13, \alpha_I[y] = 42, \alpha_I[z] = 1$

Compute the truth value of F under I

1. $I \not\models p(f(x, y), z)$ since $13 + 42 \geq 1$
2. $I \not\models p(y, g(z, x))$ since $42 \geq 1 - 13$
3. $I \models F$ by 1, 2, and \rightarrow

F is true under I

For a variable x :

Definition (x -variant)

An x -variant of interpretation I is an interpretation $J : (D_J, \alpha_J)$ such that

- $D_I = D_J$
- $\alpha_I[y] = \alpha_J[y]$ for all symbols y , except possibly x

That is, I and J agree on everything except possibly the value of x

Denote $J : I \triangleleft \{x \mapsto v\}$ the x -variant of I in which $\alpha_J[x] = v$ for some $v \in D_I$. Then

- $I \models \forall x. F$ iff for all $v \in D_I$, $I \triangleleft \{x \mapsto v\} \models F$
- $I \models \exists x. F$ iff there exists $v \in D_I$ s.t. $I \triangleleft \{x \mapsto v\} \models F$

Consider

$$F : \forall x. \exists y. 2 \cdot y = x$$

Here $2 \cdot y$ is the infix notation of the term $\cdot(2, y)$,
and $2 \cdot y = x$ is the infix notation of the atom $= (\cdot(2, y), x)$.

- 2 is a 0-ary function symbol (a constant).
- \cdot is a 2-ary function symbol.
- $=$ is a 2-ary predicate symbol.
- x, y are variables.

What is the truth-value of F ?

$$F : \forall x. \exists y. 2 \cdot y = x$$

Let I be the standard interpretation for integers, $D_I = \mathbb{Z}$.

Compute the value of F under I :

$$I \models \forall x. \exists y. 2 \cdot y = x$$

iff

$$\text{for all } v \in D_I, I \triangleleft \{x \mapsto v\} \models \exists y. 2 \cdot y = x$$

iff

$$\text{for all } v \in D_I, \text{ there exists } v_1 \in D_I, I \triangleleft \{x \mapsto v\} \triangleleft \{y \mapsto v_1\} \models 2 \cdot y = x$$

The latter is false since for $1 \in D_I$ there is no number v_1 with $2 \cdot v_1 = 1$.

$$F : \forall x. \exists y. 2 \cdot y = x$$

Let I be the standard interpretation for rational numbers, $D_I = \mathbb{Q}$.
 Compute the value of F under I :

$$I \models \forall x. \exists y. 2 \cdot y = x$$

iff

$$\text{for all } v \in D_I, I \triangleleft \{x \mapsto v\} \models \exists y. 2 \cdot y = x$$

iff

$$\text{for all } v \in D_I, \text{ there exists } v_1 \in D_I, I \triangleleft \{x \mapsto v\} \triangleleft \{y \mapsto v_1\} \models 2 \cdot y = x$$

The latter is true since for $v \in D_I$ we can choose $v_1 = \frac{v}{2}$.

Definition (Satisfiability)

F is **satisfiable** iff there exists an interpretation I such that $I \models F$.

Definition (Validity)

F is **valid** iff for all interpretations I , $I \models F$.

Note

F is valid iff $\neg F$ is unsatisfiable

Suppose, we want to replace terms with other terms in formulas, e.g.

$$F : \forall y. (p(x, y) \rightarrow p(y, x))$$

should be transformed to

$$G : \forall y. (p(a, y) \rightarrow p(y, a))$$

We call the mapping from x to a a substitution denoted as $\sigma : \{x \mapsto a\}$.

We write $F\sigma$ for the formula G .

Another convenient notation is $F[x]$ for a formula containing the variable x and $F[a]$ for $F\sigma$.

Definition (Substitution)

A substitution is a mapping from terms to terms, e.g.

$$\sigma : \{t_1 \mapsto s_1, \dots, t_n \mapsto s_n\}$$

By $F\sigma$ we denote the application of σ to formula F , i.e., the formula F where all occurrences of t_1, \dots, t_n are replaced by s_1, \dots, s_n .

For a formula named $F[x]$ we write $F[t]$ as shorthand for $F[x]\{x \mapsto t\}$.

Care has to be taken in the presence of quantifiers:

$$F[x] : \exists y. y = Succ(x)$$

What is $F[y]$?

We need to **rename** bounded variables occurring in the substitution:

$$F[y] : \exists y'. y' = Succ(y)$$

Bounded renaming does not change the models of a formula:

$$(\exists y. y = Succ(x)) \Leftrightarrow (\exists y'. y' = Succ(x))$$

$$t\sigma = \begin{cases} \sigma(t) & t \in \text{dom}(\sigma) \\ f(t_1\sigma, \dots, t_n\sigma) & t \notin \text{dom}(\sigma) \wedge t = f(t_1, \dots, t_n) \\ x & t \notin \text{dom}(\sigma) \wedge t = x \end{cases}$$

$$p(t_1, \dots, t_n)\sigma = p(t_1\sigma, \dots, t_n\sigma)$$

$$(\neg F)\sigma = \neg(F\sigma)$$

$$(F \wedge G)\sigma = (F\sigma) \wedge (G\sigma)$$

...

$$(\forall x. F)\sigma = \begin{cases} \forall x. F\sigma & x \notin \text{Vars}(\sigma) \\ \forall x'. ((F\{x \mapsto x'\})\sigma) & \text{otherwise and } x' \text{ is fresh} \end{cases}$$

$$(\exists x. F)\sigma = \begin{cases} \exists x. F\sigma & x \notin \text{Vars}(\sigma) \\ \exists x'. ((F\{x \mapsto x'\})\sigma) & \text{otherwise and } x' \text{ is fresh} \end{cases}$$

$$F : (\forall x. p(x, y)) \rightarrow q(f(y), x)$$

bound by $\forall x$ \nearrow \nwarrow free \nearrow \nwarrow free

$$\sigma : \{x \mapsto g(x), y \mapsto f(x), f(y) \mapsto h(x, y)\}$$

$F\sigma$?

- 1 Rename

$$F' : \forall x'. p(x', y) \rightarrow q(f(y), x)$$

\uparrow \uparrow

where x' is a fresh variable

- 2 $F\sigma : \forall x'. p(x', f(x)) \rightarrow q(h(x, y), g(x))$

Recall rules from propositional logic:

$$\frac{I \models \neg F}{I \not\models F}$$

$$\frac{I \models F \wedge G}{\begin{array}{l} I \models F \\ I \models G \end{array}} \leftarrow \text{and}$$

$$\frac{I \models F \vee G}{I \models F \mid I \models G}$$

$$\frac{I \models F \rightarrow G}{I \not\models F \mid I \models G}$$

$$\frac{I \models F \leftrightarrow G}{I \models F \wedge G \mid I \not\models F \vee G}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} I \models F \\ I \not\models F \\ \hline I \models \perp \end{array}$$

$$\frac{I \not\models \neg F}{I \models F}$$

$$\frac{I \not\models F \wedge G}{\begin{array}{l} I \not\models F \\ I \not\models G \end{array}} \leftarrow \text{or}$$

$$\frac{I \not\models F \vee G}{\begin{array}{l} I \not\models F \\ I \not\models G \end{array}}$$

$$\frac{I \not\models F \rightarrow G}{\begin{array}{l} I \models F \\ I \not\models G \end{array}}$$

$$\frac{I \not\models F \leftrightarrow G}{I \models F \wedge \neg G \mid I \models \neg F \wedge G}$$

The following additional rules are used for quantifiers:

$$\frac{I \models \forall x.F[x] \text{ for any term } t}{I \models F[t]}$$

$$\frac{I \not\models \forall x.F[x] \text{ for a fresh constant } a}{I \not\models F[a]}$$

$$\frac{I \models \exists x.F[x] \text{ for a fresh constant } a}{I \models F[a]}$$

$$\frac{I \not\models \exists x.F[x] \text{ for any term } t}{I \not\models F[t]}$$

(We assume that there are infinitely many constant symbols.)

The formula $F[t]$ is created from the formula $F[x]$ by the substitution $\{x \mapsto t\}$ (roughly, replace every x by t).

Show that $(\exists x. \forall y. p(x, y)) \rightarrow (\forall x. \exists y. p(y, x))$ is valid.

Assume otherwise.

- | | | |
|----|---|--|
| 1. | $I \not\models (\exists x. \forall y. p(x, y)) \rightarrow (\forall x. \exists y. p(y, x))$ | assumption |
| 2. | $I \models \exists x. \forall y. p(x, y)$ | 1 and \rightarrow |
| 3. | $I \not\models \forall x. \exists y. p(y, x)$ | 1 and \rightarrow |
| 4. | $I \models \forall y. p(a, y)$ | 2, $\exists (x \mapsto a \text{ fresh})$ |
| 5. | $I \not\models \exists y. p(y, b)$ | 3, $\forall (x \mapsto b \text{ fresh})$ |
| 6. | $I \models p(a, b)$ | 4, $\forall (y \mapsto b)$ |
| 7. | $I \not\models p(a, b)$ | 5, $\exists (y \mapsto a)$ |
| 8. | $I \models \perp$ | 6,7 contradictory |

Thus, the formula is valid.

Is $F : (\forall x. p(x, x)) \rightarrow (\exists x. \forall y. p(x, y))$ valid?

Assume I is a falsifying interpretation for F and apply semantic argument:

- | | | |
|----|--|---------------------|
| 1. | $I \not\models (\forall x. p(x, x)) \rightarrow (\exists x. \forall y. p(x, y))$ | |
| 2. | $I \models \forall x. p(x, x)$ | 1 and \rightarrow |
| 3. | $I \not\models \exists x. \forall y. p(x, y)$ | 1 and \rightarrow |
| 4. | $I \models p(a_1, a_1)$ | 2, \forall |
| 5. | $I \not\models \forall y. p(a_1, y)$ | 3, \exists |
| 6. | $I \not\models p(a_1, a_2)$ | 5, \forall |
| 7. | $I \models p(a_2, a_2)$ | 2, \forall |
| 8. | $I \not\models \forall y. p(a_2, y)$ | 3, \exists |
| 9. | $I \not\models p(a_2, a_3)$ | 8, \forall |
| | \vdots | |

No contradiction. Falsifying interpretation I can be “read” from proof:

$$D_I = \mathbb{N}, \quad p_I(x, y) = \begin{cases} \text{true} & y = x, \\ \text{false} & y = x + 1, \\ \text{arbitrary} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

To show FOL formula F is valid, assume $I \not\models F$ and derive a contradiction $I \models \perp$ in all branches

- **Soundness**

If every branch of a semantic argument proof reach $I \models \perp$, then F is valid

- **Completeness**

Each valid formula F has a semantic argument proof in which every branch reach $I \models \perp$

- **Non-termination**

For an invalid formula F the method is not guaranteed to terminate. Thus, the semantic argument is **not** a decision procedure for validity.

If for interpretation I the assumption of the proof holds then there is an interpretation I' and a branch such that all statements on that branch hold.

I' differs from I in the values $\alpha_I[a_i]$ of fresh constants a_i .

If all branches of the proof end with $I \models \perp$, then the assumption was wrong. Thus, if the assumption was $I \not\models F$, then F must be valid.

Consider (finite or infinite) proof trees starting with $I \not\vdash F$. We assume that

- all possible proof rules were applied in all non-closed branches.
- the \forall and \exists rules were applied for all terms.
This is possible since the terms are countable.

If every branch is closed, the tree is finite (König's Lemma) and we have a finite proof for F .

Otherwise, the proof tree has at least one open branch P . We show that F is not valid.

- 1 The statements on that branch P form a **Hintikka set**:
 - $I \models F \wedge G \in P$ implies $I \models F \in P$ and $I \models G \in P$.
 - $I \not\models F \wedge G \in P$ implies $I \not\models F \in P$ or $I \not\models G \in P$.
 - $I \models \forall x. F[x] \in P$ implies for all terms t , $I \models F[t] \in P$.
 - $I \not\models \forall x. F[x] \in P$ implies for some term a , $I \not\models F[a] \in P$.
 - Similarly for $\exists, \rightarrow, \leftrightarrow, \exists$.
- 2 Choose $D_I := \{t \mid t \text{ is term}\}$, $\alpha_I[f](t_1, \dots, t_n) = f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$,
 $\alpha_I[x] = x$ (every term is interpreted as itself)

$$\alpha_I[p](t_1, \dots, t_n) = \begin{cases} \text{true} & I \models p(t_1, \dots, t_n) \in P \\ \text{false} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- 3 I satisfies all statements on the branch.
In particular, I is a falsifying interpretation of F , thus F is not valid.

Also in first-order logic normal forms can be used:

- Devise an algorithm to convert a formula to a normal form.
- Then devise an algorithm for satisfiability/validity that only works on the normal form.

Negations appear only in literals. (only $\neg, \wedge, \vee, \exists, \forall$)

To transform F to equivalent F' in NNF use recursively the following template equivalences (left-to-right):

$$\begin{array}{l} \neg\neg F_1 \Leftrightarrow F_1 \quad \neg\top \Leftrightarrow \perp \quad \neg\perp \Leftrightarrow \top \\ \neg(F_1 \wedge F_2) \Leftrightarrow \neg F_1 \vee \neg F_2 \\ \neg(F_1 \vee F_2) \Leftrightarrow \neg F_1 \wedge \neg F_2 \end{array} \left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{l} \neg\neg F_1 \Leftrightarrow F_1 \\ \neg(F_1 \wedge F_2) \Leftrightarrow \neg F_1 \vee \neg F_2 \\ \neg(F_1 \vee F_2) \Leftrightarrow \neg F_1 \wedge \neg F_2 \end{array}} \right\} \text{De Morgan's Law}$$

$$F_1 \rightarrow F_2 \Leftrightarrow \neg F_1 \vee F_2$$

$$F_1 \leftrightarrow F_2 \Leftrightarrow (F_1 \rightarrow F_2) \wedge (F_2 \rightarrow F_1)$$

$$\neg\forall x. F[x] \Leftrightarrow \exists x. \neg F[x]$$

$$\neg\exists x. F[x] \Leftrightarrow \forall x. \neg F[x]$$

$$G : \forall x. (\exists y. p(x, y) \wedge p(x, z)) \rightarrow \exists w. p(x, w) .$$

$$\textcircled{1} \quad \forall x. (\exists y. p(x, y) \wedge p(x, z)) \rightarrow \exists w. p(x, w)$$

$$\textcircled{2} \quad \forall x. \neg(\exists y. p(x, y) \wedge p(x, z)) \vee \exists w. p(x, w)$$

$$F_1 \rightarrow F_2 \Leftrightarrow \neg F_1 \vee F_2$$

$$\textcircled{3} \quad \forall x. (\forall y. \neg(p(x, y) \wedge p(x, z))) \vee \exists w. p(x, w)$$

$$\neg \exists x. F[x] \Leftrightarrow \forall x. \neg F[x]$$

$$\textcircled{4} \quad \forall x. (\forall y. \neg p(x, y) \vee \neg p(x, z)) \vee \exists w. p(x, w)$$

All quantifiers appear at the beginning of the formula

$$Q_1 x_1 \cdots Q_n x_n. F[x_1, \dots, x_n]$$

where $Q_i \in \{\forall, \exists\}$ and F is quantifier-free.

Every FOL formula F can be transformed to formula F' in PNF s.t.
 $F' \Leftrightarrow F$:

- 1 Write F in NNF
- 2 Rename quantified variables to fresh names
- 3 Move all quantifiers to the front

Find equivalent PNF of

$$F : \forall x. ((\exists y. p(x, y) \wedge p(x, z)) \rightarrow \exists y. p(x, y))$$

- Write F in NNF

$$F_1 : \forall x. (\forall y. \neg p(x, y) \vee \neg p(x, z)) \vee \exists y. p(x, y)$$

- Rename quantified variables to fresh names

$$F_2 : \forall x. (\forall y. \neg p(x, y) \vee \neg p(x, z)) \vee \exists w. p(x, w)$$

↑
in the scope of $\forall x$

- Move all quantifiers to the front

$$F_3 : \forall x. \forall y. \exists w. \neg p(x, y) \vee \neg p(x, z) \vee p(x, w)$$

Alternately,

$$F'_3 : \forall x. \exists w. \forall y. \neg p(x, y) \vee \neg p(x, z) \vee p(x, w)$$

Note: In F_2 , $\forall y$ is **in the scope** of $\forall x$, therefore the order of quantifiers must be $\dots \forall x \dots \forall y \dots$

$$F_4 \Leftrightarrow F \text{ and } F'_4 \Leftrightarrow F$$

Note: However $G \not\Leftrightarrow F$

$$G : \forall y. \exists w. \forall x. \neg p(x, y) \vee \neg p(x, z) \vee p(x, w)$$

- FOL is undecidable (Turing & Church)

There does not exist an algorithm for deciding if a FOL formula F is valid, i.e. always halt and says “yes” if F is valid or say “no” if F is invalid.

- FOL is semi-decidable

There is a procedure that always halts and says “yes” if F is valid, but may not halt if F is invalid.

On the other hand,

- PL is decidable

There exists an algorithm for deciding if a PL formula F is valid, e.g., the truth-table procedure.

Similarly for satisfiability